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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /scripts/Makefile.userprogs
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/Makefile.userprogs')
-rw-r--r--scripts/Makefile.userprogs45
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.userprogs b/scripts/Makefile.userprogs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f3a7e1ef3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.userprogs
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#
+# Build userspace programs for the target system
+#
+
+# Executables compiled from a single .c file
+user-csingle := $(foreach m, $(userprogs), $(if $($(m)-objs),,$(m)))
+
+# Executables linked based on several .o files
+user-cmulti := $(foreach m, $(userprogs), $(if $($(m)-objs),$(m)))
+
+# Objects compiled from .c files
+user-cobjs := $(sort $(foreach m, $(userprogs), $($(m)-objs)))
+
+user-csingle := $(addprefix $(obj)/, $(user-csingle))
+user-cmulti := $(addprefix $(obj)/, $(user-cmulti))
+user-cobjs := $(addprefix $(obj)/, $(user-cobjs))
+
+user_ccflags = -Wp,-MMD,$(depfile) $(KBUILD_USERCFLAGS) $(userccflags) \
+ $($(target-stem)-userccflags)
+user_ldflags = $(KBUILD_USERLDFLAGS) $(userldflags) $($(target-stem)-userldflags)
+user_ldlibs = $(userldlibs) $($(target-stem)-userldlibs)
+
+# Create an executable from a single .c file
+quiet_cmd_user_cc_c = CC [U] $@
+ cmd_user_cc_c = $(CC) $(user_ccflags) $(user_ldflags) -o $@ $< \
+ $(user_ldlibs)
+$(user-csingle): $(obj)/%: $(src)/%.c FORCE
+ $(call if_changed_dep,user_cc_c)
+
+# Link an executable based on list of .o files
+quiet_cmd_user_ld = LD [U] $@
+ cmd_user_ld = $(CC) $(user_ldflags) -o $@ \
+ $(addprefix $(obj)/, $($(target-stem)-objs)) $(user_ldlibs)
+$(user-cmulti): FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,user_ld)
+$(call multi_depend, $(user-cmulti), , -objs)
+
+# Create .o file from a .c file
+quiet_cmd_user_cc_o_c = CC [U] $@
+ cmd_user_cc_o_c = $(CC) $(user_ccflags) -c -o $@ $<
+$(user-cobjs): $(obj)/%.o: $(src)/%.c FORCE
+ $(call if_changed_dep,user_cc_o_c)
+
+targets += $(user-csingle) $(user-cmulti) $(user-cobjs)