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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /scripts/Makefile.kasan | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/Makefile.kasan')
| -rw-r--r-- | scripts/Makefile.kasan | 106 |
1 files changed, 106 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.kasan b/scripts/Makefile.kasan new file mode 100644 index 000000000..91504e812 --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/Makefile.kasan @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_KASAN_MEMINTRINSIC_PREFIX +# Safe for compiler to generate meminstrinsic calls in uninstrumented files. +CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := +else +# Don't let compiler generate memintrinsic calls in uninstrumented files +# because they are instrumented. +CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE := -fno-builtin +endif + +KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ?= $(CONFIG_KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) + +cc-param = $(call cc-option, -mllvm -$(1), $(call cc-option, --param $(1))) +rustc-param = $(call rustc-option, -Cllvm-args=-$(1),) + +check-args = $(foreach arg,$(2),$(call $(1),$(arg))) + +kasan_params := + +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_STACK + stack_enable := 1 +else + stack_enable := 0 +endif + +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC + +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + # When the number of memory accesses in a function is less than this + # call threshold number, the compiler will use inline instrumentation. + # 10000 is chosen offhand as a sufficiently large number to make all + # kernel functions to be instrumented inline. + call_threshold := 10000 +else + call_threshold := 0 +endif + +# First, enable -fsanitize=kernel-address together with providing the shadow +# mapping offset, as for GCC, -fasan-shadow-offset fails without -fsanitize +# (GCC accepts the shadow mapping offset via -fasan-shadow-offset instead of +# a --param like the other KASAN parameters). +# Instead of ifdef-checking the compiler, rely on cc-option. +CFLAGS_KASAN := $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address \ + -fasan-shadow-offset=$(KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET), \ + $(call cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address \ + -mllvm -asan-mapping-offset=$(KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET))) + +# The minimum supported `rustc` version has a minimum supported LLVM +# version late enough that we can assume support for -asan-mapping-offset. +RUSTFLAGS_KASAN := -Zsanitizer=kernel-address \ + -Zsanitizer-recover=kernel-address \ + -Cllvm-args=-asan-mapping-offset=$(KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) + +# Now, add other parameters enabled similarly in GCC, Clang, and rustc. +# As some of them are not supported by older compilers, these will be filtered +# through `cc-param` or `rust-param` as applicable. +kasan_params += asan-instrumentation-with-call-threshold=$(call_threshold) \ + asan-stack=$(stack_enable) \ + asan-instrument-allocas=1 \ + asan-globals=1 + +# Instrument memcpy/memset/memmove calls by using instrumented __asan_mem*() +# instead. With compilers that don't support this option, compiler-inserted +# memintrinsics won't be checked by KASAN on GENERIC_ENTRY architectures. +kasan_params += asan-kernel-mem-intrinsic-prefix=1 + +endif # CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC + +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS + +CFLAGS_KASAN := -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress + +RUSTFLAGS_KASAN := -Zsanitizer=kernel-hwaddress \ + -Zsanitizer-recover=kernel-hwaddress + +ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE + kasan_params += hwasan-mapping-offset=$(KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) +else + kasan_params += hwasan-instrument-with-calls=1 +endif + +kasan_params += hwasan-instrument-stack=$(stack_enable) \ + hwasan-use-short-granules=0 \ + hwasan-inline-all-checks=0 + +# Instrument memcpy/memset/memmove calls by using instrumented __(hw)asan_mem*(). +ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_KASAN_MEMINTRINSIC_PREFIX + ifdef CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC + kasan_params += asan-kernel-mem-intrinsic-prefix=1 + else + kasan_params += hwasan-kernel-mem-intrinsic-prefix=1 + endif +endif # CONFIG_CC_HAS_KASAN_MEMINTRINSIC_PREFIX + +endif # CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS + +# Add all as-supported KASAN LLVM parameters requested by the configuration. +CFLAGS_KASAN += $(call check-args, cc-param, $(kasan_params)) + +ifdef CONFIG_RUST + # Avoid calling `rustc-param` unless Rust is enabled. + RUSTFLAGS_KASAN += $(call check-args, rustc-param, $(kasan_params)) +endif # CONFIG_RUST + +export CFLAGS_KASAN CFLAGS_KASAN_NOSANITIZE RUSTFLAGS_KASAN |
