iio: proximity: vl53l0x-i2c: claim direct mode for raw readsgrafted

vl53l0x_read_raw() starts a single-shot ranging measurement and reads
back the result. Once the triggered buffer is enabled the sensor runs in
continuous mode and its data-ready interrupt is routed to the trigger,
so a concurrent in_distance_raw read disturbs the streaming setup and
never gets its completion, returning -ETIMEDOUT.

The original submission claimed direct mode here, but it was dropped
during review because the driver had no buffer support at the time [1].
Continuous (buffered) mode was later added without restoring the
claim [2], reintroducing the conflict.

Reject direct reads while buffered capture is active by claiming direct
mode around the measurement, as the vl53l1x sibling already does.

Fixes: 762186c6e7b1 ("iio: proximity: vl53l0x-i2c: Added continuous mode support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iio/20180911160300.GA9212@himanshu-Vostro-3559/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iio/20240909101508.263085-3-abhashkumarjha123@gmail.com/ [2]
Signed-off-by: Donggeun Yoo <donggeunyoo.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@oss.qualcomm.com>

1 files changed, 85 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/samples/check-exec/set-exec.c b/samples/check-exec/set-exec.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba86a60a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/check-exec/set-exec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * Simple tool to set SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE,
+ * before executing a command.
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2024 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#define __SANE_USERSPACE_TYPES__
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+static void print_usage(const char *argv0)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -f|-i -- <cmd> [args]...\n\n", argv0);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Execute a command with\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "- SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE set: -f\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "- SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE set: -i\n");
+}
+
+int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
+{
+	const char *cmd_path;
+	char *const *cmd_argv;
+	int opt, secbits_cur, secbits_new;
+	bool has_policy = false;
+
+	secbits_cur = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+	if (secbits_cur == -1) {
+		/*
+		 * This should never happen, except with a buggy seccomp
+		 * filter.
+		 */
+		perror("ERROR: Failed to get securebits");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	secbits_new = secbits_cur;
+	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "fi")) != -1) {
+		switch (opt) {
+		case 'f':
+			secbits_new |= SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE |
+				       SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+			has_policy = true;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			secbits_new |= SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE |
+				       SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED;
+			has_policy = true;
+			break;
+		default:
+			print_usage(argv[0]);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!argv[optind] || !has_policy) {
+		print_usage(argv[0]);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (secbits_cur != secbits_new &&
+	    prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secbits_new)) {
+		perror("Failed to set secure bit(s).");
+		fprintf(stderr,
+			"Hint: The running kernel may not support this feature.\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	cmd_path = argv[optind];
+	cmd_argv = argv + optind;
+	fprintf(stderr, "Executing command...\n");
+	execvpe(cmd_path, cmd_argv, envp);
+	fprintf(stderr, "Failed to execute \"%s\": %s\n", cmd_path,
+		strerror(errno));
+	return 1;
+}