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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2026-09-25 15:55:03 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2026-09-25 15:55:03 -0700
commit75467f60a3d14f08f86f2b353298d2826382ff23 (patch)
treeacd8a7d5b5a675042449386efa5b42ec44d8bf81 /samples/check-exec/set-exec.c
downloadlinux-stable-75467f60a3d14f08f86f2b353298d2826382ff23.tar.gz
linux-stable-75467f60a3d14f08f86f2b353298d2826382ff23.zip
Merge tag 'ipe-pr-20260925' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipegrafted
Pull IPE fixes from Fan Wu: "Two fixes for use-after-free issues found by recent LLM-assisted code analysis. - move successful policy load auditing under the new policy directory's inode lock, preventing a concurrent policy deletion from freeing the policy while it is still being audited - protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU, preventing policy evaluation from racing with root hash replacement during preresume" * tag 'ipe-pr-20260925' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe: ipe: protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU ipe: fix use-after-free when auditing a newly loaded policy
Diffstat (limited to 'samples/check-exec/set-exec.c')
-rw-r--r--samples/check-exec/set-exec.c85
1 files changed, 85 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/samples/check-exec/set-exec.c b/samples/check-exec/set-exec.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ba86a60a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/samples/check-exec/set-exec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+/*
+ * Simple tool to set SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE, SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE,
+ * before executing a command.
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2024 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#define __SANE_USERSPACE_TYPES__
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+static void print_usage(const char *argv0)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s -f|-i -- <cmd> [args]...\n\n", argv0);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Execute a command with\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "- SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE set: -f\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "- SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE set: -i\n");
+}
+
+int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
+{
+ const char *cmd_path;
+ char *const *cmd_argv;
+ int opt, secbits_cur, secbits_new;
+ bool has_policy = false;
+
+ secbits_cur = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS);
+ if (secbits_cur == -1) {
+ /*
+ * This should never happen, except with a buggy seccomp
+ * filter.
+ */
+ perror("ERROR: Failed to get securebits");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ secbits_new = secbits_cur;
+ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "fi")) != -1) {
+ switch (opt) {
+ case 'f':
+ secbits_new |= SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE |
+ SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED;
+ has_policy = true;
+ break;
+ case 'i':
+ secbits_new |= SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE |
+ SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED;
+ has_policy = true;
+ break;
+ default:
+ print_usage(argv[0]);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!argv[optind] || !has_policy) {
+ print_usage(argv[0]);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (secbits_cur != secbits_new &&
+ prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, secbits_new)) {
+ perror("Failed to set secure bit(s).");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Hint: The running kernel may not support this feature.\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ cmd_path = argv[optind];
+ cmd_argv = argv + optind;
+ fprintf(stderr, "Executing command...\n");
+ execvpe(cmd_path, cmd_argv, envp);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to execute \"%s\": %s\n", cmd_path,
+ strerror(errno));
+ return 1;
+}