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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /samples/bpf/xdp_sample.bpf.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'samples/bpf/xdp_sample.bpf.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | samples/bpf/xdp_sample.bpf.h | 121 |
1 files changed, 121 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/samples/bpf/xdp_sample.bpf.h b/samples/bpf/xdp_sample.bpf.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fecc41c5d --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/bpf/xdp_sample.bpf.h @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#ifndef _XDP_SAMPLE_BPF_H +#define _XDP_SAMPLE_BPF_H + +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h> +#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h> +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> + +#include "net_shared.h" +#include "xdp_sample_shared.h" + +#define EINVAL 22 +#define ENETDOWN 100 +#define EMSGSIZE 90 +#define EOPNOTSUPP 95 +#define ENOSPC 28 + +typedef struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY); + __uint(map_flags, BPF_F_MMAPABLE); + __type(key, unsigned int); + __type(value, struct datarec); +} array_map; + +extern array_map rx_cnt; +extern const volatile int nr_cpus; + +enum { + XDP_REDIRECT_SUCCESS = 0, + XDP_REDIRECT_ERROR = 1 +}; + +static __always_inline void swap_src_dst_mac(void *data) +{ + unsigned short *p = data; + unsigned short dst[3]; + + dst[0] = p[0]; + dst[1] = p[1]; + dst[2] = p[2]; + p[0] = p[3]; + p[1] = p[4]; + p[2] = p[5]; + p[3] = dst[0]; + p[4] = dst[1]; + p[5] = dst[2]; +} + +/* + * Note: including linux/compiler.h or linux/kernel.h for the macros below + * conflicts with vmlinux.h include in BPF files, so we define them here. + * + * Following functions are taken from kernel sources and + * break aliasing rules in their original form. + * + * While kernel is compiled with -fno-strict-aliasing, + * perf uses -Wstrict-aliasing=3 which makes build fail + * under gcc 4.4. + * + * Using extra __may_alias__ type to allow aliasing + * in this case. + */ +typedef __u8 __attribute__((__may_alias__)) __u8_alias_t; +typedef __u16 __attribute__((__may_alias__)) __u16_alias_t; +typedef __u32 __attribute__((__may_alias__)) __u32_alias_t; +typedef __u64 __attribute__((__may_alias__)) __u64_alias_t; + +static __always_inline void __read_once_size(const volatile void *p, void *res, int size) +{ + switch (size) { + case 1: *(__u8_alias_t *) res = *(volatile __u8_alias_t *) p; break; + case 2: *(__u16_alias_t *) res = *(volatile __u16_alias_t *) p; break; + case 4: *(__u32_alias_t *) res = *(volatile __u32_alias_t *) p; break; + case 8: *(__u64_alias_t *) res = *(volatile __u64_alias_t *) p; break; + default: + asm volatile ("" : : : "memory"); + __builtin_memcpy((void *)res, (const void *)p, size); + asm volatile ("" : : : "memory"); + } +} + +static __always_inline void __write_once_size(volatile void *p, void *res, int size) +{ + switch (size) { + case 1: *(volatile __u8_alias_t *) p = *(__u8_alias_t *) res; break; + case 2: *(volatile __u16_alias_t *) p = *(__u16_alias_t *) res; break; + case 4: *(volatile __u32_alias_t *) p = *(__u32_alias_t *) res; break; + case 8: *(volatile __u64_alias_t *) p = *(__u64_alias_t *) res; break; + default: + asm volatile ("" : : : "memory"); + __builtin_memcpy((void *)p, (const void *)res, size); + asm volatile ("" : : : "memory"); + } +} + +#define READ_ONCE(x) \ +({ \ + union { typeof(x) __val; char __c[1]; } __u = \ + { .__c = { 0 } }; \ + __read_once_size(&(x), __u.__c, sizeof(x)); \ + __u.__val; \ +}) + +#define WRITE_ONCE(x, val) \ +({ \ + union { typeof(x) __val; char __c[1]; } __u = \ + { .__val = (val) }; \ + __write_once_size(&(x), __u.__c, sizeof(x)); \ + __u.__val; \ +}) + +/* Add a value using relaxed read and relaxed write. Less expensive than + * fetch_add when there is no write concurrency. + */ +#define NO_TEAR_ADD(x, val) WRITE_ONCE((x), READ_ONCE(x) + (val)) +#define NO_TEAR_INC(x) NO_TEAR_ADD((x), 1) + +#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0])) + +#endif |
