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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /samples/bpf/hash_func01.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'samples/bpf/hash_func01.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | samples/bpf/hash_func01.h | 55 |
1 files changed, 55 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/samples/bpf/hash_func01.h b/samples/bpf/hash_func01.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..38255812e --- /dev/null +++ b/samples/bpf/hash_func01.h @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1 + * + * Based on Paul Hsieh's (LGPG 2.1) hash function + * From: http://www.azillionmonkeys.com/qed/hash.html + */ + +#define get16bits(d) (*((const __u16 *) (d))) + +static __always_inline +__u32 SuperFastHash (const char *data, int len, __u32 initval) { + __u32 hash = initval; + __u32 tmp; + int rem; + + if (len <= 0 || data == NULL) return 0; + + rem = len & 3; + len >>= 2; + + /* Main loop */ +#pragma clang loop unroll(full) + for (;len > 0; len--) { + hash += get16bits (data); + tmp = (get16bits (data+2) << 11) ^ hash; + hash = (hash << 16) ^ tmp; + data += 2*sizeof (__u16); + hash += hash >> 11; + } + + /* Handle end cases */ + switch (rem) { + case 3: hash += get16bits (data); + hash ^= hash << 16; + hash ^= ((signed char)data[sizeof (__u16)]) << 18; + hash += hash >> 11; + break; + case 2: hash += get16bits (data); + hash ^= hash << 11; + hash += hash >> 17; + break; + case 1: hash += (signed char)*data; + hash ^= hash << 10; + hash += hash >> 1; + } + + /* Force "avalanching" of final 127 bits */ + hash ^= hash << 3; + hash += hash >> 5; + hash ^= hash << 4; + hash += hash >> 17; + hash ^= hash << 25; + hash += hash >> 6; + + return hash; +} |
