staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 67 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/rust/syn/whitespace.rs b/rust/syn/whitespace.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b7319bd7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/syn/whitespace.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
+
+pub(crate) fn skip(mut s: &str) -> &str {
+    'skip: while !s.is_empty() {
+        let byte = s.as_bytes()[0];
+        if byte == b'/' {
+            if s.starts_with("//")
+                && (!s.starts_with("///") || s.starts_with("////"))
+                && !s.starts_with("//!")
+            {
+                if let Some(i) = s.find('\n') {
+                    s = &s[i + 1..];
+                    continue;
+                } else {
+                    return "";
+                }
+            } else if s.starts_with("/**/") {
+                s = &s[4..];
+                continue;
+            } else if s.starts_with("/*")
+                && (!s.starts_with("/**") || s.starts_with("/***"))
+                && !s.starts_with("/*!")
+            {
+                let mut depth = 0;
+                let bytes = s.as_bytes();
+                let mut i = 0;
+                let upper = bytes.len() - 1;
+                while i < upper {
+                    if bytes[i] == b'/' && bytes[i + 1] == b'*' {
+                        depth += 1;
+                        i += 1; // eat '*'
+                    } else if bytes[i] == b'*' && bytes[i + 1] == b'/' {
+                        depth -= 1;
+                        if depth == 0 {
+                            s = &s[i + 2..];
+                            continue 'skip;
+                        }
+                        i += 1; // eat '/'
+                    }
+                    i += 1;
+                }
+                return s;
+            }
+        }
+        match byte {
+            b' ' | 0x09..=0x0D => {
+                s = &s[1..];
+                continue;
+            }
+            b if b <= 0x7F => {}
+            _ => {
+                let ch = s.chars().next().unwrap();
+                if is_whitespace(ch) {
+                    s = &s[ch.len_utf8()..];
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        return s;
+    }
+    s
+}
+
+fn is_whitespace(ch: char) -> bool {
+    // Rust treats left-to-right mark and right-to-left mark as whitespace
+    ch.is_whitespace() || ch == '\u{200e}' || ch == '\u{200f}'
+}