openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 67 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/rust/syn/whitespace.rs b/rust/syn/whitespace.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b7319bd7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/syn/whitespace.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
+
+pub(crate) fn skip(mut s: &str) -> &str {
+    'skip: while !s.is_empty() {
+        let byte = s.as_bytes()[0];
+        if byte == b'/' {
+            if s.starts_with("//")
+                && (!s.starts_with("///") || s.starts_with("////"))
+                && !s.starts_with("//!")
+            {
+                if let Some(i) = s.find('\n') {
+                    s = &s[i + 1..];
+                    continue;
+                } else {
+                    return "";
+                }
+            } else if s.starts_with("/**/") {
+                s = &s[4..];
+                continue;
+            } else if s.starts_with("/*")
+                && (!s.starts_with("/**") || s.starts_with("/***"))
+                && !s.starts_with("/*!")
+            {
+                let mut depth = 0;
+                let bytes = s.as_bytes();
+                let mut i = 0;
+                let upper = bytes.len() - 1;
+                while i < upper {
+                    if bytes[i] == b'/' && bytes[i + 1] == b'*' {
+                        depth += 1;
+                        i += 1; // eat '*'
+                    } else if bytes[i] == b'*' && bytes[i + 1] == b'/' {
+                        depth -= 1;
+                        if depth == 0 {
+                            s = &s[i + 2..];
+                            continue 'skip;
+                        }
+                        i += 1; // eat '/'
+                    }
+                    i += 1;
+                }
+                return s;
+            }
+        }
+        match byte {
+            b' ' | 0x09..=0x0D => {
+                s = &s[1..];
+                continue;
+            }
+            b if b <= 0x7F => {}
+            _ => {
+                let ch = s.chars().next().unwrap();
+                if is_whitespace(ch) {
+                    s = &s[ch.len_utf8()..];
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        return s;
+    }
+    s
+}
+
+fn is_whitespace(ch: char) -> bool {
+    // Rust treats left-to-right mark and right-to-left mark as whitespace
+    ch.is_whitespace() || ch == '\u{200e}' || ch == '\u{200f}'
+}