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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /rust/syn/verbatim.rs | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'rust/syn/verbatim.rs')
| -rw-r--r-- | rust/syn/verbatim.rs | 35 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rust/syn/verbatim.rs b/rust/syn/verbatim.rs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..97bc08f70 --- /dev/null +++ b/rust/syn/verbatim.rs @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT + +use crate::parse::ParseStream; +use proc_macro2::{Delimiter, TokenStream}; +use std::cmp::Ordering; +use std::iter; + +pub(crate) fn between<'a>(begin: ParseStream<'a>, end: ParseStream<'a>) -> TokenStream { + let end = end.cursor(); + let mut cursor = begin.cursor(); + assert!(crate::buffer::same_buffer(end, cursor)); + + let mut tokens = TokenStream::new(); + while cursor != end { + let (tt, next) = cursor.token_tree().unwrap(); + + if crate::buffer::cmp_assuming_same_buffer(end, next) == Ordering::Less { + // A syntax node can cross the boundary of a None-delimited group + // due to such groups being transparent to the parser in most cases. + // Any time this occurs the group is known to be semantically + // irrelevant. https://github.com/dtolnay/syn/issues/1235 + if let Some((inside, _span, after)) = cursor.group(Delimiter::None) { + assert!(next == after); + cursor = inside; + continue; + } else { + panic!("verbatim end must not be inside a delimited group"); + } + } + + tokens.extend(iter::once(tt)); + cursor = next; + } + tokens +} |
