summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/rust/syn/thread.rs
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /rust/syn/thread.rs
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'rust/syn/thread.rs')
-rw-r--r--rust/syn/thread.rs62
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rust/syn/thread.rs b/rust/syn/thread.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4165a173d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/syn/thread.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
+
+use std::fmt::{self, Debug};
+use std::thread::{self, ThreadId};
+
+/// ThreadBound is a Sync-maker and Send-maker that allows accessing a value
+/// of type T only from the original thread on which the ThreadBound was
+/// constructed.
+pub(crate) struct ThreadBound<T> {
+ value: T,
+ thread_id: ThreadId,
+}
+
+unsafe impl<T> Sync for ThreadBound<T> {}
+
+// Send bound requires Copy, as otherwise Drop could run in the wrong place.
+//
+// Today Copy and Drop are mutually exclusive so `T: Copy` implies `T: !Drop`.
+// This impl needs to be revisited if that restriction is relaxed in the future.
+unsafe impl<T: Copy> Send for ThreadBound<T> {}
+
+impl<T> ThreadBound<T> {
+ pub(crate) fn new(value: T) -> Self {
+ ThreadBound {
+ value,
+ thread_id: thread::current().id(),
+ }
+ }
+
+ pub(crate) fn get(&self) -> Option<&T> {
+ if thread::current().id() == self.thread_id {
+ Some(&self.value)
+ } else {
+ None
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl<T: Debug> Debug for ThreadBound<T> {
+ fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
+ match self.get() {
+ Some(value) => Debug::fmt(value, formatter),
+ None => formatter.write_str("unknown"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+// Copy the bytes of T, even if the currently running thread is the "wrong"
+// thread. This is fine as long as the original thread is not simultaneously
+// mutating this value via interior mutability, which would be a data race.
+//
+// Currently `T: Copy` is sufficient to guarantee that T contains no interior
+// mutability, because _all_ interior mutability in Rust is built on
+// std::cell::UnsafeCell, which has no Copy impl. This impl needs to be
+// revisited if that restriction is relaxed in the future.
+impl<T: Copy> Copy for ThreadBound<T> {}
+
+impl<T: Copy> Clone for ThreadBound<T> {
+ fn clone(&self) -> Self {
+ *self
+ }
+}