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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /rust/syn/thread.rs | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'rust/syn/thread.rs')
| -rw-r--r-- | rust/syn/thread.rs | 62 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rust/syn/thread.rs b/rust/syn/thread.rs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4165a173d --- /dev/null +++ b/rust/syn/thread.rs @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT + +use std::fmt::{self, Debug}; +use std::thread::{self, ThreadId}; + +/// ThreadBound is a Sync-maker and Send-maker that allows accessing a value +/// of type T only from the original thread on which the ThreadBound was +/// constructed. +pub(crate) struct ThreadBound<T> { + value: T, + thread_id: ThreadId, +} + +unsafe impl<T> Sync for ThreadBound<T> {} + +// Send bound requires Copy, as otherwise Drop could run in the wrong place. +// +// Today Copy and Drop are mutually exclusive so `T: Copy` implies `T: !Drop`. +// This impl needs to be revisited if that restriction is relaxed in the future. +unsafe impl<T: Copy> Send for ThreadBound<T> {} + +impl<T> ThreadBound<T> { + pub(crate) fn new(value: T) -> Self { + ThreadBound { + value, + thread_id: thread::current().id(), + } + } + + pub(crate) fn get(&self) -> Option<&T> { + if thread::current().id() == self.thread_id { + Some(&self.value) + } else { + None + } + } +} + +impl<T: Debug> Debug for ThreadBound<T> { + fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { + match self.get() { + Some(value) => Debug::fmt(value, formatter), + None => formatter.write_str("unknown"), + } + } +} + +// Copy the bytes of T, even if the currently running thread is the "wrong" +// thread. This is fine as long as the original thread is not simultaneously +// mutating this value via interior mutability, which would be a data race. +// +// Currently `T: Copy` is sufficient to guarantee that T contains no interior +// mutability, because _all_ interior mutability in Rust is built on +// std::cell::UnsafeCell, which has no Copy impl. This impl needs to be +// revisited if that restriction is relaxed in the future. +impl<T: Copy> Copy for ThreadBound<T> {} + +impl<T: Copy> Clone for ThreadBound<T> { + fn clone(&self) -> Self { + *self + } +} |
