openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 18 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/rust/syn/print.rs b/rust/syn/print.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d73262cda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/syn/print.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
+
+use proc_macro2::TokenStream;
+use quote::ToTokens;
+
+pub(crate) struct TokensOrDefault<'a, T: 'a>(pub &'a Option<T>);
+
+impl<'a, T> ToTokens for TokensOrDefault<'a, T>
+where
+    T: ToTokens + Default,
+{
+    fn to_tokens(&self, tokens: &mut TokenStream) {
+        match self.0 {
+            Some(t) => t.to_tokens(tokens),
+            None => T::default().to_tokens(tokens),
+        }
+    }
+}