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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /rust/proc-macro2/detection.rs
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'rust/proc-macro2/detection.rs')
-rw-r--r--rust/proc-macro2/detection.rs77
1 files changed, 77 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rust/proc-macro2/detection.rs b/rust/proc-macro2/detection.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3de448cb2
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+++ b/rust/proc-macro2/detection.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
+
+use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+use std::sync::Once;
+
+static WORKS: AtomicUsize = AtomicUsize::new(0);
+static INIT: Once = Once::new();
+
+pub(crate) fn inside_proc_macro() -> bool {
+ match WORKS.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
+ 1 => return false,
+ 2 => return true,
+ _ => {}
+ }
+
+ INIT.call_once(initialize);
+ inside_proc_macro()
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn force_fallback() {
+ WORKS.store(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn unforce_fallback() {
+ initialize();
+}
+
+#[cfg(not(no_is_available))]
+fn initialize() {
+ let available = proc_macro::is_available();
+ WORKS.store(available as usize + 1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+}
+
+// Swap in a null panic hook to avoid printing "thread panicked" to stderr,
+// then use catch_unwind to determine whether the compiler's proc_macro is
+// working. When proc-macro2 is used from outside of a procedural macro all
+// of the proc_macro crate's APIs currently panic.
+//
+// The Once is to prevent the possibility of this ordering:
+//
+// thread 1 calls take_hook, gets the user's original hook
+// thread 1 calls set_hook with the null hook
+// thread 2 calls take_hook, thinks null hook is the original hook
+// thread 2 calls set_hook with the null hook
+// thread 1 calls set_hook with the actual original hook
+// thread 2 calls set_hook with what it thinks is the original hook
+//
+// in which the user's hook has been lost.
+//
+// There is still a race condition where a panic in a different thread can
+// happen during the interval that the user's original panic hook is
+// unregistered such that their hook is incorrectly not called. This is
+// sufficiently unlikely and less bad than printing panic messages to stderr
+// on correct use of this crate. Maybe there is a libstd feature request
+// here. For now, if a user needs to guarantee that this failure mode does
+// not occur, they need to call e.g. `proc_macro2::Span::call_site()` from
+// the main thread before launching any other threads.
+#[cfg(no_is_available)]
+fn initialize() {
+ use std::panic::{self, PanicInfo};
+
+ type PanicHook = dyn Fn(&PanicInfo) + Sync + Send + 'static;
+
+ let null_hook: Box<PanicHook> = Box::new(|_panic_info| { /* ignore */ });
+ let sanity_check = &*null_hook as *const PanicHook;
+ let original_hook = panic::take_hook();
+ panic::set_hook(null_hook);
+
+ let works = panic::catch_unwind(proc_macro::Span::call_site).is_ok();
+ WORKS.store(works as usize + 1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+
+ let hopefully_null_hook = panic::take_hook();
+ panic::set_hook(original_hook);
+ if sanity_check != &*hopefully_null_hook {
+ panic!("observed race condition in proc_macro2::inside_proc_macro");
+ }
+}