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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /rust/helpers/mm.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'rust/helpers/mm.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | rust/helpers/mm.c | 50 |
1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rust/helpers/mm.c b/rust/helpers/mm.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b5540997b --- /dev/null +++ b/rust/helpers/mm.c @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/mm.h> +#include <linux/sched/mm.h> + +__rust_helper void rust_helper_mmgrab(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + mmgrab(mm); +} + +__rust_helper void rust_helper_mmdrop(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + mmdrop(mm); +} + +__rust_helper void rust_helper_mmget(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + mmget(mm); +} + +__rust_helper bool rust_helper_mmget_not_zero(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + return mmget_not_zero(mm); +} + +__rust_helper void rust_helper_mmap_read_lock(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + mmap_read_lock(mm); +} + +__rust_helper bool rust_helper_mmap_read_trylock(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + return mmap_read_trylock(mm); +} + +__rust_helper void rust_helper_mmap_read_unlock(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + mmap_read_unlock(mm); +} + +__rust_helper struct vm_area_struct * +rust_helper_vma_lookup(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr) +{ + return vma_lookup(mm, addr); +} + +__rust_helper void rust_helper_vma_end_read(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + vma_end_read(vma); +} |
