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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /rust/helpers/build_assert.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'rust/helpers/build_assert.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | rust/helpers/build_assert.c | 25 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rust/helpers/build_assert.c b/rust/helpers/build_assert.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6a54b2680 --- /dev/null +++ b/rust/helpers/build_assert.c @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/build_bug.h> + +/* + * `bindgen` binds the C `size_t` type as the Rust `usize` type, so we can + * use it in contexts where Rust expects a `usize` like slice (array) indices. + * `usize` is defined to be the same as C's `uintptr_t` type (can hold any + * pointer) but not necessarily the same as `size_t` (can hold the size of any + * single object). Most modern platforms use the same concrete integer type for + * both of them, but in case we find ourselves on a platform where + * that's not true, fail early instead of risking ABI or + * integer-overflow issues. + * + * If your platform fails this assertion, it means that you are in + * danger of integer-overflow bugs (even if you attempt to add + * `--no-size_t-is-usize`). It may be easiest to change the kernel ABI on + * your platform such that `size_t` matches `uintptr_t` (i.e., to increase + * `size_t`, because `uintptr_t` has to be at least as big as `size_t`). + */ +static_assert( + sizeof(size_t) == sizeof(uintptr_t) && + __alignof__(size_t) == __alignof__(uintptr_t), + "Rust code expects C `size_t` to match Rust `usize`" +); |
