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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /rust/helpers/build_assert.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
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staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'rust/helpers/build_assert.c')
-rw-r--r--rust/helpers/build_assert.c25
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rust/helpers/build_assert.c b/rust/helpers/build_assert.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6a54b2680
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/helpers/build_assert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+
+/*
+ * `bindgen` binds the C `size_t` type as the Rust `usize` type, so we can
+ * use it in contexts where Rust expects a `usize` like slice (array) indices.
+ * `usize` is defined to be the same as C's `uintptr_t` type (can hold any
+ * pointer) but not necessarily the same as `size_t` (can hold the size of any
+ * single object). Most modern platforms use the same concrete integer type for
+ * both of them, but in case we find ourselves on a platform where
+ * that's not true, fail early instead of risking ABI or
+ * integer-overflow issues.
+ *
+ * If your platform fails this assertion, it means that you are in
+ * danger of integer-overflow bugs (even if you attempt to add
+ * `--no-size_t-is-usize`). It may be easiest to change the kernel ABI on
+ * your platform such that `size_t` matches `uintptr_t` (i.e., to increase
+ * `size_t`, because `uintptr_t` has to be at least as big as `size_t`).
+ */
+static_assert(
+ sizeof(size_t) == sizeof(uintptr_t) &&
+ __alignof__(size_t) == __alignof__(uintptr_t),
+ "Rust code expects C `size_t` to match Rust `usize`"
+);