diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /rust/build_error.rs | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'rust/build_error.rs')
| -rw-r--r-- | rust/build_error.rs | 31 |
1 files changed, 31 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/rust/build_error.rs b/rust/build_error.rs new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fa24eeef9 --- /dev/null +++ b/rust/build_error.rs @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +//! Build-time error. +//! +//! This crate provides a [const function][const-functions] `build_error`, which will panic in +//! compile-time if executed in [const context][const-context], and will cause a build error +//! if not executed at compile time and the optimizer does not optimise away the call. +//! +//! It is used by `build_assert!` in the kernel crate, allowing checking of +//! conditions that could be checked statically, but could not be enforced in +//! Rust yet (e.g. perform some checks in [const functions][const-functions], but those +//! functions could still be called in the runtime). +//! +//! For details on constant evaluation in Rust, please see the [Reference][const-eval]. +//! +//! [const-eval]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/reference/const_eval.html +//! [const-functions]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/reference/const_eval.html#const-functions +//! [const-context]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/reference/const_eval.html#const-context + +#![no_std] + +/// Panics if executed in [const context][const-context], or triggers a build error if not. +/// +/// [const-context]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/reference/const_eval.html#const-context +#[inline(never)] +#[cold] +#[export_name = "rust_build_error"] +#[track_caller] +pub const fn build_error(msg: &'static str) -> ! { + panic!("{}", msg); +} |
