diff options
| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /net/wireless/michael-mic.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/wireless/michael-mic.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/wireless/michael-mic.c | 87 |
1 files changed, 87 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/wireless/michael-mic.c b/net/wireless/michael-mic.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ec5164756 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/wireless/michael-mic.c @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Michael MIC implementation - optimized for TKIP MIC operations + * Copyright 2002-2003, Instant802 Networks, Inc. + */ +#include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/ieee80211.h> +#include <linux/unaligned.h> + +struct michael_mic_ctx { + u32 l, r; +}; + +static void michael_block(struct michael_mic_ctx *mctx, u32 val) +{ + mctx->l ^= val; + mctx->r ^= rol32(mctx->l, 17); + mctx->l += mctx->r; + mctx->r ^= ((mctx->l & 0xff00ff00) >> 8) | + ((mctx->l & 0x00ff00ff) << 8); + mctx->l += mctx->r; + mctx->r ^= rol32(mctx->l, 3); + mctx->l += mctx->r; + mctx->r ^= ror32(mctx->l, 2); + mctx->l += mctx->r; +} + +static void michael_mic_hdr(struct michael_mic_ctx *mctx, const u8 *key, + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr) +{ + u8 *da, *sa, tid; + + da = ieee80211_get_DA(hdr); + sa = ieee80211_get_SA(hdr); + if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) + tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr); + else + tid = 0; + + mctx->l = get_unaligned_le32(key); + mctx->r = get_unaligned_le32(key + 4); + + /* + * A pseudo header (DA, SA, Priority, 0, 0, 0) is used in Michael MIC + * calculation, but it is _not_ transmitted + */ + michael_block(mctx, get_unaligned_le32(da)); + michael_block(mctx, get_unaligned_le16(&da[4]) | + (get_unaligned_le16(sa) << 16)); + michael_block(mctx, get_unaligned_le32(&sa[2])); + michael_block(mctx, tid); +} + +void michael_mic(const u8 *key, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr, + const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic) +{ + u32 val; + size_t block, blocks, left; + struct michael_mic_ctx mctx; + + michael_mic_hdr(&mctx, key, hdr); + + /* Real data */ + blocks = data_len / 4; + left = data_len % 4; + + for (block = 0; block < blocks; block++) + michael_block(&mctx, get_unaligned_le32(&data[block * 4])); + + /* Partial block of 0..3 bytes and padding: 0x5a + 4..7 zeros to make + * total length a multiple of 4. */ + val = 0x5a; + while (left > 0) { + val <<= 8; + left--; + val |= data[blocks * 4 + left]; + } + + michael_block(&mctx, val); + michael_block(&mctx, 0); + + put_unaligned_le32(mctx.l, mic); + put_unaligned_le32(mctx.r, mic + 4); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(michael_mic); |
