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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /net/wireless/michael-mic.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/wireless/michael-mic.c')
-rw-r--r--net/wireless/michael-mic.c87
1 files changed, 87 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/wireless/michael-mic.c b/net/wireless/michael-mic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ec5164756
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/wireless/michael-mic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Michael MIC implementation - optimized for TKIP MIC operations
+ * Copyright 2002-2003, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/ieee80211.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+
+struct michael_mic_ctx {
+ u32 l, r;
+};
+
+static void michael_block(struct michael_mic_ctx *mctx, u32 val)
+{
+ mctx->l ^= val;
+ mctx->r ^= rol32(mctx->l, 17);
+ mctx->l += mctx->r;
+ mctx->r ^= ((mctx->l & 0xff00ff00) >> 8) |
+ ((mctx->l & 0x00ff00ff) << 8);
+ mctx->l += mctx->r;
+ mctx->r ^= rol32(mctx->l, 3);
+ mctx->l += mctx->r;
+ mctx->r ^= ror32(mctx->l, 2);
+ mctx->l += mctx->r;
+}
+
+static void michael_mic_hdr(struct michael_mic_ctx *mctx, const u8 *key,
+ struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr)
+{
+ u8 *da, *sa, tid;
+
+ da = ieee80211_get_DA(hdr);
+ sa = ieee80211_get_SA(hdr);
+ if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
+ tid = ieee80211_get_tid(hdr);
+ else
+ tid = 0;
+
+ mctx->l = get_unaligned_le32(key);
+ mctx->r = get_unaligned_le32(key + 4);
+
+ /*
+ * A pseudo header (DA, SA, Priority, 0, 0, 0) is used in Michael MIC
+ * calculation, but it is _not_ transmitted
+ */
+ michael_block(mctx, get_unaligned_le32(da));
+ michael_block(mctx, get_unaligned_le16(&da[4]) |
+ (get_unaligned_le16(sa) << 16));
+ michael_block(mctx, get_unaligned_le32(&sa[2]));
+ michael_block(mctx, tid);
+}
+
+void michael_mic(const u8 *key, struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr,
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
+{
+ u32 val;
+ size_t block, blocks, left;
+ struct michael_mic_ctx mctx;
+
+ michael_mic_hdr(&mctx, key, hdr);
+
+ /* Real data */
+ blocks = data_len / 4;
+ left = data_len % 4;
+
+ for (block = 0; block < blocks; block++)
+ michael_block(&mctx, get_unaligned_le32(&data[block * 4]));
+
+ /* Partial block of 0..3 bytes and padding: 0x5a + 4..7 zeros to make
+ * total length a multiple of 4. */
+ val = 0x5a;
+ while (left > 0) {
+ val <<= 8;
+ left--;
+ val |= data[blocks * 4 + left];
+ }
+
+ michael_block(&mctx, val);
+ michael_block(&mctx, 0);
+
+ put_unaligned_le32(mctx.l, mic);
+ put_unaligned_le32(mctx.r, mic + 4);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(michael_mic);