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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/tls/tls_proc.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/tls/tls_proc.c')
-rw-r--r--net/tls/tls_proc.c63
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_proc.c b/net/tls/tls_proc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4012c4372
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tls/tls_proc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0-only OR BSD-2-Clause)
+/* Copyright (C) 2019 Netronome Systems, Inc. */
+
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <net/snmp.h>
+#include <net/tls.h>
+
+#include "tls.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+static const struct snmp_mib tls_mib_list[] = {
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsCurrTxSw", LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRTXSW),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsCurrRxSw", LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXSW),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsCurrTxDevice", LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRTXDEVICE),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsCurrRxDevice", LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXDEVICE),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsTxSw", LINUX_MIB_TLSTXSW),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxSw", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXSW),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsTxDevice", LINUX_MIB_TLSTXDEVICE),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxDevice", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXDEVICE),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsDecryptError", LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxDeviceResync", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXDEVICERESYNC),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsDecryptRetry", LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTRETRY),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxNoPadViolation", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXNOPADVIOL),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxRekeyOk", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXREKEYOK),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxRekeyError", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXREKEYERROR),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsTxRekeyOk", LINUX_MIB_TLSTXREKEYOK),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsTxRekeyError", LINUX_MIB_TLSTXREKEYERROR),
+ SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxRekeyReceived", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXREKEYRECEIVED),
+};
+
+static int tls_statistics_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ unsigned long buf[ARRAY_SIZE(tls_mib_list)];
+ const int cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(tls_mib_list);
+ struct net *net = seq->private;
+ int i;
+
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ snmp_get_cpu_field_batch_cnt(buf, tls_mib_list, cnt,
+ net->mib.tls_statistics);
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++)
+ seq_printf(seq, "%-32s\t%lu\n", tls_mib_list[i].name, buf[i]);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int __net_init tls_proc_init(struct net *net)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+ if (!proc_create_net_single("tls_stat", 0444, net->proc_net,
+ tls_statistics_seq_show, NULL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void __net_exit tls_proc_fini(struct net *net)
+{
+ remove_proc_entry("tls_stat", net->proc_net);
+}