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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /net/tls/tls_proc.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/tls/tls_proc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/tls/tls_proc.c | 63 |
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_proc.c b/net/tls/tls_proc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4012c4372 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/tls/tls_proc.c @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0-only OR BSD-2-Clause) +/* Copyright (C) 2019 Netronome Systems, Inc. */ + +#include <linux/proc_fs.h> +#include <linux/seq_file.h> +#include <net/snmp.h> +#include <net/tls.h> + +#include "tls.h" + +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS +static const struct snmp_mib tls_mib_list[] = { + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsCurrTxSw", LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRTXSW), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsCurrRxSw", LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXSW), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsCurrTxDevice", LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRTXDEVICE), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsCurrRxDevice", LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXDEVICE), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsTxSw", LINUX_MIB_TLSTXSW), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxSw", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXSW), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsTxDevice", LINUX_MIB_TLSTXDEVICE), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxDevice", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXDEVICE), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsDecryptError", LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxDeviceResync", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXDEVICERESYNC), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsDecryptRetry", LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTRETRY), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxNoPadViolation", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXNOPADVIOL), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxRekeyOk", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXREKEYOK), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxRekeyError", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXREKEYERROR), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsTxRekeyOk", LINUX_MIB_TLSTXREKEYOK), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsTxRekeyError", LINUX_MIB_TLSTXREKEYERROR), + SNMP_MIB_ITEM("TlsRxRekeyReceived", LINUX_MIB_TLSRXREKEYRECEIVED), +}; + +static int tls_statistics_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + unsigned long buf[ARRAY_SIZE(tls_mib_list)]; + const int cnt = ARRAY_SIZE(tls_mib_list); + struct net *net = seq->private; + int i; + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + snmp_get_cpu_field_batch_cnt(buf, tls_mib_list, cnt, + net->mib.tls_statistics); + for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) + seq_printf(seq, "%-32s\t%lu\n", tls_mib_list[i].name, buf[i]); + + return 0; +} +#endif + +int __net_init tls_proc_init(struct net *net) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS + if (!proc_create_net_single("tls_stat", 0444, net->proc_net, + tls_statistics_seq_show, NULL)) + return -ENOMEM; +#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ + + return 0; +} + +void __net_exit tls_proc_fini(struct net *net) +{ + remove_proc_entry("tls_stat", net->proc_net); +} |
