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authorPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>2026-08-14 15:43:51 -0700
committerPaul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>2026-08-14 15:43:51 -0700
commit9cc63f8bcd560c760d0b12e15bba8f81c86237cf (patch)
tree3b5269b1bcf6714171754946367c51e0590f64da /net/sysctl_net.c
downloadlinux-stable-9cc63f8bcd560c760d0b12e15bba8f81c86237cf.tar.gz
linux-stable-9cc63f8bcd560c760d0b12e15bba8f81c86237cf.zip
Merge branches 'expcb.2026.07.24a', 'misc.2026.07.30a', 'rcu-tasks.2026.07.30a', 'srcu.2026.08.11a' and 'torture.2026.08.14a' into HEADgrafted
Changes: Make expedited grace periods expedite normal RCU callbacks Miscellaneous fixes: * Improve diagnostic output with character task states. * Mark accesses to inform KCSAN of concurrency design. * Move from kmalloc() to kmalloc_obj(). * Documentation updates. * Improve handling of RCU deferred quiescent states. * Clean up unused function arguments and structure fields. * Reduce show_rcu_gp_kthreads() stack space. Tasks RCU updates: * Clean up after SRCU re-implementation of Tasks Trace RCU. * Mark accesses to inform KCSAN of concurrency design. * Add ->lazy_timer status to diagnostic output. * Remove an unnecessary memory barrier. * Fix a data race, courtesy of KCSAN. * Documentation updates. * Convert cond_resched_tasks_rcu_qs() from macro to static inline function. SRCU updates: * Add Rust helpers for SRCU. * Avoid losing queued work at cleanup_srcu_struct() time. Torture-test updates: * Preparation work for immediate RCU priority deboosting. * Test RCU readers from real interrupt handlers (as opposed to softirq). * Simplify code through use of cpumask_next_wrap(). * Improve diagnostic output with character task states. * Add rcutorture.nwriters parameter to allow lightweight stall testing, and rcutorture.stall_only to make doing so easier. * Test an RCU Tasks Trace grace period implying an RCU grace period. * Make RCU Tasks Trace torturing track reader batches. * Fix a data race, courtesy of KCSAN. * Plug a shuffle_tmp_mask memory leak on kthread spawn failure.
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sysctl_net.c')
-rw-r--r--net/sysctl_net.c179
1 files changed, 179 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/sysctl_net.c b/net/sysctl_net.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..19e804824
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sysctl_net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* -*- linux-c -*-
+ * sysctl_net.c: sysctl interface to net subsystem.
+ *
+ * Begun April 1, 1996, Mike Shaver.
+ * Added /proc/sys/net directories for each protocol family. [MS]
+ *
+ * Revision 1.2 1996/05/08 20:24:40 shaver
+ * Added bits for NET_BRIDGE and the NET_IPV4_ARP stuff and
+ * NET_IPV4_IP_FORWARD.
+ *
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INET
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NET
+#include <linux/if_ether.h>
+#endif
+
+static struct ctl_table_set *
+net_ctl_header_lookup(struct ctl_table_root *root)
+{
+ return &current->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls;
+}
+
+static int is_seen(struct ctl_table_set *set)
+{
+ return &current->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls == set;
+}
+
+/* Return standard mode bits for table entry. */
+static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head,
+ const struct ctl_table *table)
+{
+ struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls);
+
+ /* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */
+ if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
+ int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7;
+ return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode;
+ }
+
+ return table->mode;
+}
+
+static void net_ctl_set_ownership(struct ctl_table_header *head,
+ kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid)
+{
+ struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls);
+ kuid_t ns_root_uid;
+ kgid_t ns_root_gid;
+
+ ns_root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
+ if (uid_valid(ns_root_uid))
+ *uid = ns_root_uid;
+
+ ns_root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
+ if (gid_valid(ns_root_gid))
+ *gid = ns_root_gid;
+}
+
+static struct ctl_table_root net_sysctl_root = {
+ .lookup = net_ctl_header_lookup,
+ .permissions = net_ctl_permissions,
+ .set_ownership = net_ctl_set_ownership,
+};
+
+static int __net_init sysctl_net_init(struct net *net)
+{
+ setup_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls, &net_sysctl_root, is_seen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __net_exit sysctl_net_exit(struct net *net)
+{
+ retire_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls);
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations sysctl_pernet_ops = {
+ .init = sysctl_net_init,
+ .exit = sysctl_net_exit,
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table_header *net_header;
+__init int net_sysctl_init(void)
+{
+ static struct ctl_table empty[1];
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+ /* Avoid limitations in the sysctl implementation by
+ * registering "/proc/sys/net" as an empty directory not in a
+ * network namespace.
+ */
+ net_header = register_sysctl_sz("net", empty, 0);
+ if (!net_header)
+ goto out;
+ ret = register_pernet_subsys(&sysctl_pernet_ops);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out1;
+out:
+ return ret;
+out1:
+ unregister_sysctl_table(net_header);
+ net_header = NULL;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/* Verify that sysctls for non-init netns are safe by either:
+ * 1) being read-only, or
+ * 2) having a data pointer which points outside of the global kernel/module
+ * data segment, and rather into the heap where a per-net object was
+ * allocated.
+ */
+static void ensure_safe_net_sysctl(struct net *net, const char *path,
+ struct ctl_table *table, size_t table_size)
+{
+ struct ctl_table *ent;
+
+ pr_debug("Registering net sysctl (net %p): %s\n", net, path);
+ ent = table;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < table_size; ent++, i++) {
+ unsigned long addr;
+ const char *where;
+
+ pr_debug(" procname=%s mode=%o proc_handler=%ps data=%p\n",
+ ent->procname, ent->mode, ent->proc_handler, ent->data);
+
+ /* If it's not writable inside the netns, then it can't hurt. */
+ if ((ent->mode & 0222) == 0) {
+ pr_debug(" Not writable by anyone\n");
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Where does data point? */
+ addr = (unsigned long)ent->data;
+ if (is_module_address(addr))
+ where = "module";
+ else if (is_kernel_core_data(addr))
+ where = "kernel";
+ else
+ continue;
+
+ /* If it is writable and points to kernel/module global
+ * data, then it's probably a netns leak.
+ */
+ WARN(1, "sysctl %s/%s: data points to %s global data: %ps\n",
+ path, ent->procname, where, ent->data);
+
+ /* Make it "safe" by dropping writable perms */
+ ent->mode &= ~0222;
+ }
+}
+
+struct ctl_table_header *register_net_sysctl_sz(struct net *net,
+ const char *path,
+ struct ctl_table *table,
+ size_t table_size)
+{
+ if (!net_eq(net, &init_net))
+ ensure_safe_net_sysctl(net, path, table, table_size);
+
+ return __register_sysctl_table(&net->sysctls, path, table, table_size);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_net_sysctl_sz);
+
+void unregister_net_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header *header)
+{
+ unregister_sysctl_table(header);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_net_sysctl_table);