staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/smc/Makefile b/net/smc/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5368634c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/smc/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+ccflags-y += -I$(src)
+obj-$(CONFIG_SMC)	+= smc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SMC_DIAG)	+= smc_diag.o
+smc-y := af_smc.o smc_pnet.o smc_ib.o smc_clc.o smc_core.o smc_wr.o smc_llc.o
+smc-y += smc_cdc.o smc_tx.o smc_rx.o smc_close.o smc_ism.o smc_netlink.o smc_stats.o
+smc-y += smc_tracepoint.o smc_inet.o
+smc-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += smc_sysctl.o
+smc-$(CONFIG_SMC_HS_CTRL_BPF) += smc_hs_bpf.o