openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 79 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/sched/em_nbyte.c b/net/sched/em_nbyte.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c65ffa5ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sched/em_nbyte.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * net/sched/em_nbyte.c	N-Byte ematch
+ *
+ * Authors:	Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/tc_ematch/tc_em_nbyte.h>
+#include <net/pkt_cls.h>
+
+struct nbyte_data {
+	struct tcf_em_nbyte	hdr;
+	char			pattern[];
+};
+
+static int em_nbyte_change(struct net *net, void *data, int data_len,
+			   struct tcf_ematch *em)
+{
+	struct tcf_em_nbyte *nbyte = data;
+
+	if (data_len < sizeof(*nbyte) ||
+	    data_len < (sizeof(*nbyte) + nbyte->len))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	em->datalen = sizeof(*nbyte) + nbyte->len;
+	em->data = (unsigned long)kmemdup(data, em->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (em->data == 0UL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int em_nbyte_match(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcf_ematch *em,
+			  struct tcf_pkt_info *info)
+{
+	struct nbyte_data *nbyte = (struct nbyte_data *) em->data;
+	unsigned char *ptr = tcf_get_base_ptr(skb, nbyte->hdr.layer);
+
+	if (!ptr)
+		return 0;
+	ptr += nbyte->hdr.off;
+
+	if (!tcf_valid_offset(skb, ptr, nbyte->hdr.len))
+		return 0;
+
+	return !memcmp(ptr, nbyte->pattern, nbyte->hdr.len);
+}
+
+static struct tcf_ematch_ops em_nbyte_ops = {
+	.kind	  = TCF_EM_NBYTE,
+	.change	  = em_nbyte_change,
+	.match	  = em_nbyte_match,
+	.owner	  = THIS_MODULE,
+	.link	  = LIST_HEAD_INIT(em_nbyte_ops.link)
+};
+
+static int __init init_em_nbyte(void)
+{
+	return tcf_em_register(&em_nbyte_ops);
+}
+
+static void __exit exit_em_nbyte(void)
+{
+	tcf_em_unregister(&em_nbyte_ops);
+}
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ematch classifier for arbitrary skb multi-bytes");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+module_init(init_em_nbyte);
+module_exit(exit_em_nbyte);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_TCF_EMATCH(TCF_EM_NBYTE);