openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 99 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/sched/em_cmp.c b/net/sched/em_cmp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..48c1bce74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sched/em_cmp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * net/sched/em_cmp.c	Simple packet data comparison ematch
+ *
+ * Authors:	Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/tc_ematch/tc_em_cmp.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+#include <net/pkt_cls.h>
+
+static inline int cmp_needs_transformation(struct tcf_em_cmp *cmp)
+{
+	return unlikely(cmp->flags & TCF_EM_CMP_TRANS);
+}
+
+static int em_cmp_match(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcf_ematch *em,
+			struct tcf_pkt_info *info)
+{
+	struct tcf_em_cmp *cmp = (struct tcf_em_cmp *) em->data;
+	unsigned char *ptr = tcf_get_base_ptr(skb, cmp->layer);
+	u32 val = 0;
+
+	if (!ptr)
+		return 0;
+	ptr += cmp->off;
+	if (!tcf_valid_offset(skb, ptr, cmp->align))
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (cmp->align) {
+	case TCF_EM_ALIGN_U8:
+		val = *ptr;
+		break;
+
+	case TCF_EM_ALIGN_U16:
+		val = get_unaligned_be16(ptr);
+
+		if (cmp_needs_transformation(cmp))
+			val = be16_to_cpu(val);
+		break;
+
+	case TCF_EM_ALIGN_U32:
+		/* Worth checking boundaries? The branching seems
+		 * to get worse. Visit again.
+		 */
+		val = get_unaligned_be32(ptr);
+
+		if (cmp_needs_transformation(cmp))
+			val = be32_to_cpu(val);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (cmp->mask)
+		val &= cmp->mask;
+
+	switch (cmp->opnd) {
+	case TCF_EM_OPND_EQ:
+		return val == cmp->val;
+	case TCF_EM_OPND_LT:
+		return val < cmp->val;
+	case TCF_EM_OPND_GT:
+		return val > cmp->val;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct tcf_ematch_ops em_cmp_ops = {
+	.kind	  = TCF_EM_CMP,
+	.datalen  = sizeof(struct tcf_em_cmp),
+	.match	  = em_cmp_match,
+	.owner	  = THIS_MODULE,
+	.link	  = LIST_HEAD_INIT(em_cmp_ops.link)
+};
+
+static int __init init_em_cmp(void)
+{
+	return tcf_em_register(&em_cmp_ops);
+}
+
+static void __exit exit_em_cmp(void)
+{
+	tcf_em_unregister(&em_cmp_ops);
+}
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("ematch classifier for basic data types(8/16/32 bit) against skb data");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+
+module_init(init_em_cmp);
+module_exit(exit_em_cmp);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_TCF_EMATCH(TCF_EM_CMP);