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authorJinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200
commita5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch)
tree73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /net/sched/act_connmark.c
downloadlinux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz
linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.zip
x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sched/act_connmark.c')
-rw-r--r--net/sched/act_connmark.c284
1 files changed, 284 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/sched/act_connmark.c b/net/sched/act_connmark.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c634af5ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/sched/act_connmark.c
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * net/sched/act_connmark.c netfilter connmark retriever action
+ * skb mark is over-written
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
+*/
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include <linux/pkt_cls.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <net/netlink.h>
+#include <net/pkt_sched.h>
+#include <net/act_api.h>
+#include <net/pkt_cls.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/tc_act/tc_connmark.h>
+#include <net/tc_act/tc_connmark.h>
+#include <net/tc_wrapper.h>
+
+#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h>
+#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core.h>
+#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_zones.h>
+
+static struct tc_action_ops act_connmark_ops;
+
+TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_connmark_act(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct tc_action *a,
+ struct tcf_result *res)
+{
+ const struct nf_conntrack_tuple_hash *thash;
+ struct nf_conntrack_tuple tuple;
+ enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
+ struct tcf_connmark_info *ca = to_connmark(a);
+ struct tcf_connmark_parms *parms;
+ struct nf_conntrack_zone zone;
+ struct nf_conn *c;
+ int proto;
+
+ tcf_lastuse_update(&ca->tcf_tm);
+ tcf_action_update_bstats(&ca->common, skb);
+
+ parms = rcu_dereference_bh(ca->parms);
+
+ switch (skb_protocol(skb, true)) {
+ case htons(ETH_P_IP):
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(struct iphdr))
+ goto out;
+
+ proto = NFPROTO_IPV4;
+ break;
+ case htons(ETH_P_IPV6):
+ if (skb->len < sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))
+ goto out;
+
+ proto = NFPROTO_IPV6;
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ c = nf_ct_get(skb, &ctinfo);
+ if (c) {
+ skb->mark = READ_ONCE(c->mark);
+ goto count;
+ }
+
+ if (!nf_ct_get_tuplepr(skb, skb_network_offset(skb), proto, parms->net,
+ &tuple))
+ goto out;
+
+ zone.id = parms->zone;
+ zone.dir = NF_CT_DEFAULT_ZONE_DIR;
+
+ thash = nf_conntrack_find_get(parms->net, &zone, &tuple);
+ if (!thash)
+ goto out;
+
+ c = nf_ct_tuplehash_to_ctrack(thash);
+ skb->mark = READ_ONCE(c->mark);
+ nf_ct_put(c);
+
+count:
+ /* using overlimits stats to count how many packets marked */
+ tcf_action_inc_overlimit_qstats(&ca->common);
+out:
+ return parms->action;
+}
+
+static const struct nla_policy connmark_policy[TCA_CONNMARK_MAX + 1] = {
+ [TCA_CONNMARK_PARMS] = { .len = sizeof(struct tc_connmark) },
+};
+
+static int tcf_connmark_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla,
+ struct nlattr *est, struct tc_action **a,
+ struct tcf_proto *tp, u32 flags,
+ struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
+{
+ struct tc_action_net *tn = net_generic(net, act_connmark_ops.net_id);
+ struct tcf_connmark_parms *nparms, *oparms;
+ struct nlattr *tb[TCA_CONNMARK_MAX + 1];
+ bool bind = flags & TCA_ACT_FLAGS_BIND;
+ struct tcf_chain *goto_ch = NULL;
+ struct tcf_connmark_info *ci;
+ struct tc_connmark *parm;
+ int ret = 0, err;
+ u32 index;
+
+ if (!nla)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(tb, TCA_CONNMARK_MAX, nla,
+ connmark_policy, NULL);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!tb[TCA_CONNMARK_PARMS])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ nparms = kzalloc_obj(*nparms);
+ if (!nparms)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ parm = nla_data(tb[TCA_CONNMARK_PARMS]);
+ index = parm->index;
+ ret = tcf_idr_check_alloc(tn, &index, a, bind);
+ if (!ret) {
+ ret = tcf_idr_create_from_flags(tn, index, est, a,
+ &act_connmark_ops, bind, flags);
+ if (ret) {
+ tcf_idr_cleanup(tn, index);
+ err = ret;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ ci = to_connmark(*a);
+
+ nparms->net = net;
+ nparms->zone = parm->zone;
+
+ ret = ACT_P_CREATED;
+ } else if (ret > 0) {
+ ci = to_connmark(*a);
+ if (bind) {
+ err = ACT_P_BOUND;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ if (!(flags & TCA_ACT_FLAGS_REPLACE)) {
+ err = -EEXIST;
+ goto release_idr;
+ }
+
+ nparms->net = rtnl_dereference(ci->parms)->net;
+ nparms->zone = parm->zone;
+
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ err = ret;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ err = tcf_action_check_ctrlact(parm->action, tp, &goto_ch, extack);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto release_idr;
+
+ nparms->action = parm->action;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&ci->tcf_lock);
+ goto_ch = tcf_action_set_ctrlact(*a, parm->action, goto_ch);
+ oparms = rcu_replace_pointer(ci->parms, nparms, lockdep_is_held(&ci->tcf_lock));
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ci->tcf_lock);
+
+ if (goto_ch)
+ tcf_chain_put_by_act(goto_ch);
+
+ if (oparms)
+ kfree_rcu(oparms, rcu);
+
+ return ret;
+
+release_idr:
+ tcf_idr_release(*a, bind);
+out_free:
+ kfree(nparms);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static inline int tcf_connmark_dump(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tc_action *a,
+ int bind, int ref)
+{
+ const struct tcf_connmark_info *ci = to_connmark(a);
+ unsigned char *b = skb_tail_pointer(skb);
+ const struct tcf_connmark_parms *parms;
+ struct tc_connmark opt;
+ struct tcf_t t;
+
+ memset(&opt, 0, sizeof(opt));
+
+ opt.index = ci->tcf_index;
+ opt.refcnt = refcount_read(&ci->tcf_refcnt) - ref;
+ opt.bindcnt = atomic_read(&ci->tcf_bindcnt) - bind;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ parms = rcu_dereference(ci->parms);
+
+ opt.action = parms->action;
+ opt.zone = parms->zone;
+ if (nla_put(skb, TCA_CONNMARK_PARMS, sizeof(opt), &opt))
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+
+ tcf_tm_dump(&t, &ci->tcf_tm);
+ if (nla_put_64bit(skb, TCA_CONNMARK_TM, sizeof(t), &t,
+ TCA_CONNMARK_PAD))
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return skb->len;
+
+nla_put_failure:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ nlmsg_trim(skb, b);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static void tcf_connmark_cleanup(struct tc_action *a)
+{
+ struct tcf_connmark_info *ci = to_connmark(a);
+ struct tcf_connmark_parms *parms;
+
+ parms = rcu_dereference_protected(ci->parms, 1);
+ if (parms)
+ kfree_rcu(parms, rcu);
+}
+
+static struct tc_action_ops act_connmark_ops = {
+ .kind = "connmark",
+ .id = TCA_ID_CONNMARK,
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .act = tcf_connmark_act,
+ .dump = tcf_connmark_dump,
+ .init = tcf_connmark_init,
+ .cleanup = tcf_connmark_cleanup,
+ .size = sizeof(struct tcf_connmark_info),
+};
+MODULE_ALIAS_NET_ACT("connmark");
+
+static __net_init int connmark_init_net(struct net *net)
+{
+ struct tc_action_net *tn = net_generic(net, act_connmark_ops.net_id);
+
+ return tc_action_net_init(net, tn, &act_connmark_ops);
+}
+
+static void __net_exit connmark_exit_net(struct list_head *net_list)
+{
+ tc_action_net_exit(net_list, act_connmark_ops.net_id);
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations connmark_net_ops = {
+ .init = connmark_init_net,
+ .exit_batch = connmark_exit_net,
+ .id = &act_connmark_ops.net_id,
+ .size = sizeof(struct tc_action_net),
+};
+
+static int __init connmark_init_module(void)
+{
+ return tcf_register_action(&act_connmark_ops, &connmark_net_ops);
+}
+
+static void __exit connmark_cleanup_module(void)
+{
+ tcf_unregister_action(&act_connmark_ops, &connmark_net_ops);
+}
+
+module_init(connmark_init_module);
+module_exit(connmark_cleanup_module);
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Connection tracking mark restoring");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");