summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/rxrpc/skbuff.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/rxrpc/skbuff.c')
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/skbuff.c74
1 files changed, 74 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c b/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e2169d1a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Socket buffer accounting
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/af_rxrpc.h>
+#include "ar-internal.h"
+
+#define select_skb_count(skb) (&rxrpc_n_rx_skbs)
+
+/*
+ * Note the allocation or reception of a socket buffer.
+ */
+void rxrpc_new_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace why)
+{
+ int n = atomic_inc_return(select_skb_count(skb));
+ trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, why);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the re-emergence of a socket buffer from a queue or buffer.
+ */
+void rxrpc_see_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace why)
+{
+ if (skb) {
+ int n = atomic_read(select_skb_count(skb));
+ trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, why);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the addition of a ref on a socket buffer.
+ */
+void rxrpc_get_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace why)
+{
+ int n = atomic_inc_return(select_skb_count(skb));
+ trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, why);
+ skb_get(skb);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the destruction of a socket buffer.
+ */
+void rxrpc_free_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace why)
+{
+ if (skb) {
+ int n = atomic_dec_return(select_skb_count(skb));
+ trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, why);
+ consume_skb(skb);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear a queue of socket buffers.
+ */
+void rxrpc_purge_queue(struct sk_buff_head *list)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+ while ((skb = skb_dequeue((list))) != NULL) {
+ int n = atomic_dec_return(select_skb_count(skb));
+ trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, refcount_read(&skb->users), n,
+ rxrpc_skb_put_purge);
+ consume_skb(skb);
+ }
+}