diff options
| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/rxrpc/skbuff.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/rxrpc/skbuff.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/skbuff.c | 74 |
1 files changed, 74 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c b/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e2169d1a1 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/rxrpc/skbuff.c @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* Socket buffer accounting + * + * Copyright (C) 2007 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt + +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <net/sock.h> +#include <net/af_rxrpc.h> +#include "ar-internal.h" + +#define select_skb_count(skb) (&rxrpc_n_rx_skbs) + +/* + * Note the allocation or reception of a socket buffer. + */ +void rxrpc_new_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace why) +{ + int n = atomic_inc_return(select_skb_count(skb)); + trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, why); +} + +/* + * Note the re-emergence of a socket buffer from a queue or buffer. + */ +void rxrpc_see_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace why) +{ + if (skb) { + int n = atomic_read(select_skb_count(skb)); + trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, why); + } +} + +/* + * Note the addition of a ref on a socket buffer. + */ +void rxrpc_get_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace why) +{ + int n = atomic_inc_return(select_skb_count(skb)); + trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, why); + skb_get(skb); +} + +/* + * Note the destruction of a socket buffer. + */ +void rxrpc_free_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, enum rxrpc_skb_trace why) +{ + if (skb) { + int n = atomic_dec_return(select_skb_count(skb)); + trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, why); + consume_skb(skb); + } +} + +/* + * Clear a queue of socket buffers. + */ +void rxrpc_purge_queue(struct sk_buff_head *list) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb; + + while ((skb = skb_dequeue((list))) != NULL) { + int n = atomic_dec_return(select_skb_count(skb)); + trace_rxrpc_skb(skb, refcount_read(&skb->users), n, + rxrpc_skb_put_purge); + consume_skb(skb); + } +} |
