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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/rxrpc/misc.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/rxrpc/misc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/misc.c | 62 |
1 files changed, 62 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/misc.c b/net/rxrpc/misc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8fcc8139d --- /dev/null +++ b/net/rxrpc/misc.c @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* Miscellaneous bits + * + * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <net/sock.h> +#include <net/af_rxrpc.h> +#include "ar-internal.h" + +/* + * The maximum listening backlog queue size that may be set on a socket by + * listen(). + */ +unsigned int rxrpc_max_backlog __read_mostly = 10; + +/* + * How long to wait before scheduling an ACK with subtype DELAY (in ms). + * + * We use this when we've received new data packets. If those packets aren't + * all consumed within this time we will send a DELAY ACK if an ACK was not + * requested to let the sender know it doesn't need to resend. + */ +unsigned long rxrpc_soft_ack_delay = 1000; + +/* + * How long to wait before scheduling an ACK with subtype IDLE (in ms). + * + * We use this when we've consumed some previously soft-ACK'd packets when + * further packets aren't immediately received to decide when to send an IDLE + * ACK let the other end know that it can free up its Tx buffer space. + */ +unsigned long rxrpc_idle_ack_delay = 500; + +/* + * Receive window size in packets. This indicates the maximum number of + * unconsumed received packets we're willing to retain in memory. Once this + * limit is hit, we should generate an EXCEEDS_WINDOW ACK and discard further + * packets. + */ +unsigned int rxrpc_rx_window_size = 255; + +/* + * Maximum Rx MTU size. This indicates to the sender the size of jumbo packet + * made by gluing normal packets together that we're willing to handle. + */ +unsigned int rxrpc_rx_mtu = RXRPC_JUMBO(46); + +/* + * The maximum number of fragments in a received jumbo packet that we tell the + * sender that we're willing to handle. + */ +unsigned int rxrpc_rx_jumbo_max = 46; + +#ifdef CONFIG_AF_RXRPC_INJECT_RX_DELAY +/* + * The delay to inject into packet reception. + */ +unsigned long rxrpc_inject_rx_delay; +#endif |
