summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /net/rxrpc/insecure.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/rxrpc/insecure.c')
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/insecure.c94
1 files changed, 94 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0b39046bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Null security operations.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <net/af_rxrpc.h>
+#include "ar-internal.h"
+
+static int none_init_connection_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
+ struct rxrpc_key_token *token)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate an appropriately sized buffer for the amount of data remaining.
+ */
+static struct rxrpc_txbuf *none_alloc_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t remain, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, umin(remain, RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN), 1, gfp);
+}
+
+static int none_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb)
+{
+ txb->pkt_len = txb->len;
+ if (txb->len == RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN)
+ txb->jumboable = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int none_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void none_free_call_crypto(struct rxrpc_call *call)
+{
+}
+
+static bool none_validate_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPROTO,
+ rxrpc_eproto_rxnull_challenge);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int none_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge,
+ struct msghdr *msg)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int none_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
+ struct sk_buff *response_skb,
+ void *response, unsigned int len)
+{
+ return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, response_skb, RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPROTO,
+ rxrpc_eproto_rxnull_response);
+}
+
+static void none_clear(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
+{
+}
+
+static int none_init(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void none_exit(void)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * RxRPC Kerberos-based security
+ */
+const struct rxrpc_security rxrpc_no_security = {
+ .name = "none",
+ .security_index = RXRPC_SECURITY_NONE,
+ .init = none_init,
+ .exit = none_exit,
+ .init_connection_security = none_init_connection_security,
+ .free_call_crypto = none_free_call_crypto,
+ .alloc_txbuf = none_alloc_txbuf,
+ .secure_packet = none_secure_packet,
+ .verify_packet = none_verify_packet,
+ .validate_challenge = none_validate_challenge,
+ .sendmsg_respond_to_challenge = none_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge,
+ .verify_response = none_verify_response,
+ .clear = none_clear,
+};