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authorKees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>2026-09-02 15:31:14 -0700
committerKees Cook <kees@kernel.org>2026-09-04 21:37:00 -0700
commit3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d (patch)
treec65086f9bdcd48c6360fb7cb4598bca084da1f32 /net/rxrpc/insecure.c
downloadlinux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.tar.gz
linux-stable-3a2c4d55e32ad65efebdb6de44eef3bfa08bb49d.zip
treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversionsgrafted
This is another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc() family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules in scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci This catches both the set of kmalloc() uses added since the first kmalloc_obj() conversions in v7.0 and adds a large group missed in the first pass due to Coccinelle not interacting well with the cleanup.h scoped_...() family of macros[1]. I worked around this with spatch's "--macro-file" argument to a file with all the scoped_...() macros mapped to Coccinelle's YACFE_ITERATOR[2] as that was the closest viable control flow indicator I could find. Build tested allmodconfig on x86, arm64, arm, loongarch, mips, powerpc, riscv, and s390 with no new warnings. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202609021314.8A9C0B8@keescook/ [1] Link: https://github.com/coccinelle/coccinelle/blob/master/standard.h [2] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/rxrpc/insecure.c')
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/insecure.c94
1 files changed, 94 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0b39046bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Null security operations.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <net/af_rxrpc.h>
+#include "ar-internal.h"
+
+static int none_init_connection_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
+ struct rxrpc_key_token *token)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate an appropriately sized buffer for the amount of data remaining.
+ */
+static struct rxrpc_txbuf *none_alloc_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t remain, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, umin(remain, RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN), 1, gfp);
+}
+
+static int none_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb)
+{
+ txb->pkt_len = txb->len;
+ if (txb->len == RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN)
+ txb->jumboable = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int none_verify_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void none_free_call_crypto(struct rxrpc_call *call)
+{
+}
+
+static bool none_validate_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
+ struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPROTO,
+ rxrpc_eproto_rxnull_challenge);
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int none_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge(struct sk_buff *challenge,
+ struct msghdr *msg)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int none_verify_response(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
+ struct sk_buff *response_skb,
+ void *response, unsigned int len)
+{
+ return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, response_skb, RX_PROTOCOL_ERROR, -EPROTO,
+ rxrpc_eproto_rxnull_response);
+}
+
+static void none_clear(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
+{
+}
+
+static int none_init(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void none_exit(void)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * RxRPC Kerberos-based security
+ */
+const struct rxrpc_security rxrpc_no_security = {
+ .name = "none",
+ .security_index = RXRPC_SECURITY_NONE,
+ .init = none_init,
+ .exit = none_exit,
+ .init_connection_security = none_init_connection_security,
+ .free_call_crypto = none_free_call_crypto,
+ .alloc_txbuf = none_alloc_txbuf,
+ .secure_packet = none_secure_packet,
+ .verify_packet = none_verify_packet,
+ .validate_challenge = none_validate_challenge,
+ .sendmsg_respond_to_challenge = none_sendmsg_respond_to_challenge,
+ .verify_response = none_verify_response,
+ .clear = none_clear,
+};