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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/rxrpc/call_state.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/rxrpc/call_state.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/call_state.c | 69 |
1 files changed, 69 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/call_state.c b/net/rxrpc/call_state.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6afb54373 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/rxrpc/call_state.c @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* Call state changing functions. + * + * Copyright (C) 2022 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) + */ + +#include "ar-internal.h" + +/* + * Transition a call to the complete state. + */ +bool rxrpc_set_call_completion(struct rxrpc_call *call, + enum rxrpc_call_completion compl, + u32 abort_code, + int error) +{ + if (__rxrpc_call_state(call) == RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE) + return false; + + call->abort_code = abort_code; + call->error = error; + call->completion = compl; + /* Allow reader of completion state to operate locklessly */ + rxrpc_set_call_state(call, RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE); + trace_rxrpc_call_complete(call); + wake_up(&call->waitq); + rxrpc_notify_socket(call); + return true; +} + +/* + * Record that a call successfully completed. + */ +bool rxrpc_call_completed(struct rxrpc_call *call) +{ + return rxrpc_set_call_completion(call, RXRPC_CALL_SUCCEEDED, 0, 0); +} + +/* + * Record that a call is locally aborted. + */ +bool rxrpc_abort_call(struct rxrpc_call *call, rxrpc_seq_t seq, + u32 abort_code, int error, enum rxrpc_abort_reason why) +{ + trace_rxrpc_abort(call->debug_id, why, call->cid, call->call_id, seq, + abort_code, error); + if (!rxrpc_set_call_completion(call, RXRPC_CALL_LOCALLY_ABORTED, + abort_code, error)) + return false; + if (test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_EXPOSED, &call->flags)) + rxrpc_send_abort_packet(call); + return true; +} + +/* + * Record that a call errored out before even getting off the ground, thereby + * setting the state to allow it to be destroyed. + */ +void rxrpc_prefail_call(struct rxrpc_call *call, enum rxrpc_call_completion compl, + int error) +{ + call->abort_code = RX_CALL_DEAD; + call->error = error; + call->completion = compl; + call->_state = RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE; + trace_rxrpc_call_complete(call); + WARN_ON_ONCE(__test_and_set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_RELEASED, &call->flags)); +} |
