staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted

rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:

	const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
	...
	c = frame_body[0];
	...
	a = frame_body[1];

frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.

This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.

Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.

Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 22 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/rds/Makefile b/net/rds/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3af1ca1d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/rds/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+obj-$(CONFIG_RDS) += rds.o
+rds-y :=	af_rds.o bind.o cong.o connection.o info.o message.o   \
+			recv.o send.o stats.o sysctl.o threads.o transport.o \
+			loop.o page.o rdma.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_RDS_RDMA) += rds_rdma.o
+rds_rdma-y :=	rdma_transport.o \
+			ib.o ib_cm.o ib_recv.o ib_ring.o ib_send.o ib_stats.o \
+			ib_sysctl.o ib_rdma.o ib_frmr.o
+
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_RDS_TCP) += rds_tcp.o
+rds_tcp-y :=		tcp.o tcp_connect.o tcp_listen.o tcp_recv.o \
+			tcp_send.o tcp_stats.o
+
+ccflags-$(CONFIG_RDS_DEBUG)	:=	-DRDS_DEBUG
+
+# for GCOV coverage profiling
+ifdef CONFIG_GCOV_PROFILE_RDS
+GCOV_PROFILE := y
+endif