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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /net/nfc/af_nfc.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/nfc/af_nfc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/nfc/af_nfc.c | 88 |
1 files changed, 88 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/nfc/af_nfc.c b/net/nfc/af_nfc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dda323e0a --- /dev/null +++ b/net/nfc/af_nfc.c @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * Copyright (C) 2011 Instituto Nokia de Tecnologia + * + * Authors: + * Aloisio Almeida Jr <aloisio.almeida@openbossa.org> + * Lauro Ramos Venancio <lauro.venancio@openbossa.org> + */ + +#include <linux/nfc.h> +#include <linux/module.h> + +#include "nfc.h" + +static DEFINE_RWLOCK(proto_tab_lock); +static const struct nfc_protocol *proto_tab[NFC_SOCKPROTO_MAX]; + +static int nfc_sock_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int proto, + int kern) +{ + int rc = -EPROTONOSUPPORT; + + if (net != &init_net) + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; + + if (proto < 0 || proto >= NFC_SOCKPROTO_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + + read_lock(&proto_tab_lock); + if (proto_tab[proto] && try_module_get(proto_tab[proto]->owner)) { + rc = proto_tab[proto]->create(net, sock, proto_tab[proto], kern); + module_put(proto_tab[proto]->owner); + } + read_unlock(&proto_tab_lock); + + return rc; +} + +static const struct net_proto_family nfc_sock_family_ops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .family = PF_NFC, + .create = nfc_sock_create, +}; + +int nfc_proto_register(const struct nfc_protocol *nfc_proto) +{ + int rc; + + if (nfc_proto->id < 0 || nfc_proto->id >= NFC_SOCKPROTO_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + + rc = proto_register(nfc_proto->proto, 0); + if (rc) + return rc; + + write_lock(&proto_tab_lock); + if (proto_tab[nfc_proto->id]) + rc = -EBUSY; + else + proto_tab[nfc_proto->id] = nfc_proto; + write_unlock(&proto_tab_lock); + + if (rc) + proto_unregister(nfc_proto->proto); + + return rc; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfc_proto_register); + +void nfc_proto_unregister(const struct nfc_protocol *nfc_proto) +{ + write_lock(&proto_tab_lock); + proto_tab[nfc_proto->id] = NULL; + write_unlock(&proto_tab_lock); + + proto_unregister(nfc_proto->proto); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(nfc_proto_unregister); + +int __init af_nfc_init(void) +{ + return sock_register(&nfc_sock_family_ops); +} + +void __exit af_nfc_exit(void) +{ + sock_unregister(PF_NFC); +} |
