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authorJinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200
commita5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch)
tree73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /net/netlink/af_netlink.h
downloadlinux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz
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x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'net/netlink/af_netlink.h')
-rw-r--r--net/netlink/af_netlink.h79
1 files changed, 79 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.h b/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..778a38093
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _AF_NETLINK_H
+#define _AF_NETLINK_H
+
+#include <linux/rhashtable.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+/* flags */
+enum {
+ NETLINK_F_KERNEL_SOCKET,
+ NETLINK_F_RECV_PKTINFO,
+ NETLINK_F_BROADCAST_SEND_ERROR,
+ NETLINK_F_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS,
+ NETLINK_F_LISTEN_ALL_NSID,
+ NETLINK_F_CAP_ACK,
+ NETLINK_F_EXT_ACK,
+ NETLINK_F_STRICT_CHK,
+};
+
+#define NLGRPSZ(x) (ALIGN(x, sizeof(unsigned long) * 8) / 8)
+#define NLGRPLONGS(x) (NLGRPSZ(x)/sizeof(unsigned long))
+
+struct netlink_sock {
+ /* struct sock has to be the first member of netlink_sock */
+ struct sock sk;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u32 portid;
+ u32 dst_portid;
+ u32 dst_group;
+ u32 subscriptions;
+ u32 ngroups;
+ unsigned long *groups;
+ unsigned long state;
+ size_t max_recvmsg_len;
+ wait_queue_head_t wait;
+ bool bound;
+ bool cb_running;
+ int dump_done_errno;
+ struct netlink_callback cb;
+ struct mutex nl_cb_mutex;
+
+ void (*netlink_rcv)(struct sk_buff *skb);
+ int (*netlink_bind)(struct net *net, int group);
+ void (*netlink_unbind)(struct net *net, int group);
+ void (*netlink_release)(struct sock *sk,
+ unsigned long *groups);
+ struct module *module;
+
+ struct rhash_head node;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+static inline struct netlink_sock *nlk_sk(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return container_of(sk, struct netlink_sock, sk);
+}
+
+#define nlk_test_bit(nr, sk) test_bit(NETLINK_F_##nr, &nlk_sk(sk)->flags)
+
+struct netlink_table {
+ struct rhashtable hash;
+ struct hlist_head mc_list;
+ struct listeners __rcu *listeners;
+ unsigned int flags;
+ unsigned int groups;
+ struct mutex *cb_mutex;
+ struct module *module;
+ int (*bind)(struct net *net, int group);
+ void (*unbind)(struct net *net, int group);
+ void (*release)(struct sock *sk,
+ unsigned long *groups);
+ int registered;
+};
+
+extern struct netlink_table *nl_table;
+extern rwlock_t nl_table_lock;
+
+#endif