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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/mctp/test/utils.h | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mctp/test/utils.h')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/mctp/test/utils.h | 75 |
1 files changed, 75 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/mctp/test/utils.h b/net/mctp/test/utils.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..47603732e --- /dev/null +++ b/net/mctp/test/utils.h @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ + +#ifndef __NET_MCTP_TEST_UTILS_H +#define __NET_MCTP_TEST_UTILS_H + +#include <uapi/linux/netdevice.h> + +#include <net/mctp.h> +#include <net/mctpdevice.h> + +#include <kunit/test.h> + +#define MCTP_DEV_TEST_MTU 68 + +struct mctp_test_dev { + struct net_device *ndev; + struct mctp_dev *mdev; + + unsigned short lladdr_len; + unsigned char lladdr[MAX_ADDR_LEN]; + + struct sk_buff_head pkts; +}; + +struct mctp_test_dev; + +struct mctp_test_route { + struct mctp_route rt; +}; + +struct mctp_test_bind_setup { + mctp_eid_t bind_addr; + int bind_net; + u8 bind_type; + + bool have_peer; + mctp_eid_t peer_addr; + int peer_net; + + /* optional name. Used for comparison in "lookup" tests */ + const char *name; +}; + +struct mctp_test_dev *mctp_test_create_dev(void); +struct mctp_test_dev *mctp_test_create_dev_with_addr(mctp_eid_t eid); +struct mctp_test_dev *mctp_test_create_dev_lladdr(unsigned short lladdr_len, + const unsigned char *lladdr); +void mctp_test_destroy_dev(struct mctp_test_dev *dev); + +struct mctp_test_route *mctp_test_create_route_direct(struct net *net, + struct mctp_dev *dev, + mctp_eid_t eid, + unsigned int mtu); +struct mctp_test_route *mctp_test_create_route_gw(struct net *net, + unsigned int netid, + mctp_eid_t eid, + mctp_eid_t gw, + unsigned int mtu); +void mctp_test_dst_setup(struct kunit *test, struct mctp_dst *dst, + struct mctp_test_dev *dev, unsigned int mtu); +void mctp_test_route_destroy(struct kunit *test, struct mctp_test_route *rt); +void mctp_test_skb_set_dev(struct sk_buff *skb, struct mctp_test_dev *dev); +struct sk_buff *mctp_test_create_skb(const struct mctp_hdr *hdr, + unsigned int data_len); +struct sk_buff *__mctp_test_create_skb_data(const struct mctp_hdr *hdr, + const void *data, size_t data_len); + +#define mctp_test_create_skb_data(h, d) \ + __mctp_test_create_skb_data(h, d, sizeof(*d)) + +void mctp_test_bind_run(struct kunit *test, + const struct mctp_test_bind_setup *setup, + int *ret_bind_errno, struct socket **sock); + +#endif /* __NET_MCTP_TEST_UTILS_H */ |
