x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted

When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.

The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:

<__hrtimer_run_queues+249>:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
<__hrtimer_run_queues+254>:  mov    %r14,%rdi
<__hrtimer_run_queues+257>:  cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12>
<__hrtimer_run_queues+263>:  mov    %eax,%r12d
<__hrtimer_run_queues+266>:  xchg   %ax,%ax
<__hrtimer_run_queues+268>:  mov    %r13,%rdi

Which triggers this crash:

  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
  RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230

Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.

The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.

During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes,
so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU
returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at
the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally,
starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely
different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash.

Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from
the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return
address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro.

[ mingo: Refined the changelog ]

Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step")
Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000

1 files changed, 1075 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..be3a2e953
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1075 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * Copyright (C) 2016-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
+ * Copyright (C) 2020-2023 Intel Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/ieee80211.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/unaligned.h>
+#include <net/mac80211.h>
+#include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/utils.h>
+
+#include "ieee80211_i.h"
+#include "tkip.h"
+#include "aes_ccm.h"
+#include "aes_cmac.h"
+#include "aes_gmac.h"
+#include "aes_gcm.h"
+#include "wpa.h"
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+	u8 *data, *key, *mic;
+	size_t data_len;
+	unsigned int hdrlen;
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+	int tail;
+
+	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
+	    skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	if (skb->len < hdrlen)
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	data = skb->data + hdrlen;
+	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
+
+	if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
+		/* Need to use software crypto for the test */
+		info->control.hw_key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
+	     ieee80211_hw_check(&tx->local->hw, SUPPORTS_TX_FRAG)) &&
+	    !(tx->key->conf.flags & (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC |
+				     IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE))) {
+		/* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC or MIC space */
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
+	if (!info->control.hw_key)
+		tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
+
+	if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
+		 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
+		 "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n",
+		 skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
+		 skb_tailroom(skb), tail))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
+
+	if (tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_MIC_SPACE) {
+		/* Zeroed MIC can help with debug */
+		memset(mic, 0, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
+	michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
+	if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
+		mic[0]++;
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	u8 *data, *key = NULL;
+	size_t data_len;
+	unsigned int hdrlen;
+	u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+
+	/*
+	 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
+	 * than data frames.
+	 */
+	if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	/*
+	 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
+	 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
+	 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
+	 * MIC failure report.
+	 */
+	if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
+		if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
+			goto mic_fail_no_key;
+
+		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
+		    rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
+			goto update_iv;
+
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
+	 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
+	 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
+	 */
+	if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
+	    !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
+		/*
+		 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
+		 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
+		 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
+		 * frames in the BSS.
+		 */
+		return RX_DROP_U_AP_RX_GROUPCAST;
+	}
+
+	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
+		goto mic_fail;
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
+		return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_MMIC;
+
+	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+		return RX_DROP_U_OOM;
+	hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+
+	data = skb->data + hdrlen;
+	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
+	key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
+	michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
+	if (crypto_memneq(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN))
+		goto mic_fail;
+
+	/* remove Michael MIC from payload */
+	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
+
+update_iv:
+	/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
+	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip.iv32;
+	rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip.iv16;
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+mic_fail:
+	rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
+
+mic_fail_no_key:
+	/*
+	 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
+	 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
+	 * the key is set.
+	 */
+	cfg80211_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata->dev, hdr->addr2,
+				     is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) ?
+				     NL80211_KEYTYPE_GROUP :
+				     NL80211_KEYTYPE_PAIRWISE,
+				     rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
+				     NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	return RX_DROP_U_MMIC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+	unsigned int hdrlen;
+	int len, tail;
+	u64 pn;
+	u8 *pos;
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
+		/* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	len = skb->len - hdrlen;
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		tail = 0;
+	else
+		tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
+		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
+		return -1;
+
+	pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
+	memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
+	pos += hdrlen;
+
+	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Increase IV for the frame */
+	pn = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
+	pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, &key->conf, pn);
+
+	/* hwaccel - with software IV */
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Add room for ICV */
+	skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
+
+	return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(&tx->local->wep_tx_ctx,
+					   key, skb, pos, len);
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
+
+	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
+		if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
+			return TX_DROP;
+	}
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
+	int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
+		return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_TKIP;
+
+	/* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
+	if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+		return RX_DROP_U_OOM;
+	hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+
+	/*
+	 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
+	 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
+	 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
+	 */
+	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
+		hwaccel = 1;
+
+	res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(&rx->local->wep_rx_ctx,
+					  key, skb->data + hdrlen,
+					  skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
+					  hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
+					  &rx->tkip.iv32,
+					  &rx->tkip.iv16);
+	if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
+		return RX_DROP_U_TKIP_FAIL;
+
+	/* Trim ICV */
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED))
+		skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
+
+	/* Remove IV */
+	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
+	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate AAD for CCMP/GCMP, returning qos_tid since we
+ * need that in CCMP also for b_0.
+ */
+static u8 ccmp_gcmp_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad, bool spp_amsdu,
+			bool aad_nonce_computed)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+	__le16 mask_fc;
+	int a4_included, mgmt;
+	u8 qos_tid;
+	u16 len_a = 22;
+
+	/*
+	 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
+	 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData, Order (if Qos Data); set Protected
+	 */
+	mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
+	mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
+	mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
+				IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
+	if (!mgmt)
+		mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
+	mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
+
+	a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
+	if (a4_included)
+		len_a += 6;
+
+	if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control)) {
+		qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr);
+
+		if (spp_amsdu)
+			qos_tid &= IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK |
+				   IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_A_MSDU_PRESENT;
+		else
+			qos_tid &= IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
+
+		mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_ORDER);
+		len_a += 2;
+	} else {
+		qos_tid = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
+	 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
+	put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
+	put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
+	if (!aad_nonce_computed)
+		memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addrs, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
+
+	/* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
+	aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
+	aad[23] = 0;
+
+	if (a4_included) {
+		memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
+		aad[30] = qos_tid;
+		aad[31] = 0;
+	} else {
+		memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
+		aad[24] = qos_tid;
+	}
+
+	return qos_tid;
+}
+
+static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad,
+				bool spp_amsdu, bool aad_nonce_computed)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	u8 qos_tid = ccmp_gcmp_aad(skb, aad, spp_amsdu, aad_nonce_computed);
+
+	/* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
+	 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
+	 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
+	 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
+	 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
+	 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
+	 */
+	b_0[0] = 0x1;
+
+	/* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
+	 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
+	 */
+	b_0[1] = qos_tid | (ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control) << 4);
+	if (!aad_nonce_computed)
+		memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+	memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+}
+
+static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
+{
+	hdr[0] = pn[5];
+	hdr[1] = pn[4];
+	hdr[2] = 0;
+	hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
+	hdr[4] = pn[3];
+	hdr[5] = pn[2];
+	hdr[6] = pn[1];
+	hdr[7] = pn[0];
+}
+
+
+static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
+{
+	pn[0] = hdr[7];
+	pn[1] = hdr[6];
+	pn[2] = hdr[5];
+	pn[3] = hdr[4];
+	pn[4] = hdr[1];
+	pn[5] = hdr[0];
+}
+
+
+static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb,
+			    unsigned int mic_len)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+	int hdrlen, len, tail;
+	u8 *pos;
+	u8 pn[6];
+	u64 pn64;
+	u8 aad[CCM_AAD_LEN];
+	u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
+	    !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
+	       IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
+	      ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
+		/*
+		 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
+		 * header or MIC fields
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	len = skb->len - hdrlen;
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		tail = 0;
+	else
+		tail = mic_len;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
+		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+		return -1;
+
+	pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
+	memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
+
+	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
+		return 0;
+
+	pos += hdrlen;
+
+	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
+
+	pn[5] = pn64;
+	pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
+	pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
+	pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
+	pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
+	pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
+
+	ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
+
+	/* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		return 0;
+
+	pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
+	ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad,
+			    key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SPP_AMSDU,
+			    false);
+	return ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
+					 skb_put(skb, mic_len));
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
+			      unsigned int mic_len)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
+
+	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
+		if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb, mic_len) < 0)
+			return TX_DROP;
+	}
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
+			      unsigned int mic_len)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
+	int hdrlen;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
+	int data_len;
+	int queue;
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
+	    !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb) &&
+	    !ieee80211_require_encrypted_assoc(hdr->frame_control, rx->sta))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
+		if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
+			return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_CCMP;
+		if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
+			mic_len = 0;
+	} else {
+		if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+			return RX_DROP_U_OOM;
+	}
+
+	/* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */
+	hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data;
+
+	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
+	if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
+		return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_CCMP;
+
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
+		int res;
+
+		ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
+
+		queue = rx->security_idx;
+
+		res = memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue],
+			     IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+		if (res < 0 ||
+		    (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
+			key->u.ccmp.replays++;
+			return RX_DROP_U_REPLAY;
+		}
+
+		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+			u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+			u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+			bool aad_nonce_computed = false;
+
+			if (is_unicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
+			    !ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control)) {
+				/* AAD computation */
+				memcpy(&aad[4], rx->link_addrs, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
+				/* Nonce computation */
+				ether_addr_copy(&b_0[2],
+						&rx->link_addrs[ETH_ALEN]);
+				aad_nonce_computed = true;
+			}
+
+			/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+			ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad,
+					    key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SPP_AMSDU,
+					    aad_nonce_computed);
+
+			if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
+				    key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
+				    skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
+				    data_len,
+				    skb->data + skb->len - mic_len))
+				return RX_DROP_U_MIC_FAIL;
+		}
+
+		memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+		if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
+			memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+	}
+
+	/* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
+	if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
+		return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_CCMP_MIC;
+	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
+	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static void gcmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *j_0, u8 *aad,
+				bool spp_amsdu, bool aad_nonce_computed)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (void *)skb->data;
+
+	if (!aad_nonce_computed)
+		memcpy(j_0, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+	memcpy(&j_0[ETH_ALEN], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+
+	ccmp_gcmp_aad(skb, aad, spp_amsdu, aad_nonce_computed);
+}
+
+static inline void gcmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, const u8 *pn, int key_id)
+{
+	hdr[0] = pn[5];
+	hdr[1] = pn[4];
+	hdr[2] = 0;
+	hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
+	hdr[4] = pn[3];
+	hdr[5] = pn[2];
+	hdr[6] = pn[1];
+	hdr[7] = pn[0];
+}
+
+static inline void gcmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, const u8 *hdr)
+{
+	pn[0] = hdr[7];
+	pn[1] = hdr[6];
+	pn[2] = hdr[5];
+	pn[3] = hdr[4];
+	pn[4] = hdr[1];
+	pn[5] = hdr[0];
+}
+
+static int gcmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+	int hdrlen, len, tail;
+	u8 *pos;
+	u8 pn[6];
+	u64 pn64;
+	u8 aad[GCM_AAD_LEN];
+	u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
+	    !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
+	    !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
+	       IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
+	      ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
+		/* hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for GCMP
+		 * header or MIC fields
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	len = skb->len - hdrlen;
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		tail = 0;
+	else
+		tail = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
+		    skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
+		return -1;
+
+	pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
+	memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
+	skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) +
+				    IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
+
+	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
+		return 0;
+
+	pos += hdrlen;
+
+	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
+
+	pn[5] = pn64;
+	pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
+	pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
+	pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
+	pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
+	pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
+
+	gcmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
+
+	/* hwaccel - with software GCMP header */
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		return 0;
+
+	pos += IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN;
+	gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad,
+			    key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SPP_AMSDU,
+			    false);
+	return ieee80211_aes_gcm_encrypt(key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad, pos, len,
+					 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN));
+}
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
+
+	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
+		if (gcmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
+			return TX_DROP;
+	}
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_gcmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
+	int hdrlen;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	u8 pn[IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN];
+	int data_len, queue, mic_len = IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN;
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
+	    !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb) &&
+	    !ieee80211_require_encrypted_assoc(hdr->frame_control, rx->sta))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
+		if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN))
+			return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_GCMP;
+		if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MIC_STRIPPED)
+			mic_len = 0;
+	} else {
+		if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+			return RX_DROP_U_OOM;
+	}
+
+	/* reload hdr - skb might have been reallocated */
+	hdr = (void *)rx->skb->data;
+
+	data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN - mic_len;
+	if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
+		return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_GCMP;
+
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_PN_VALIDATED)) {
+		int res;
+
+		gcmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
+
+		queue = rx->security_idx;
+
+		res = memcmp(pn, key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue],
+			     IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+		if (res < 0 ||
+		    (!res && !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ALLOW_SAME_PN))) {
+			key->u.gcmp.replays++;
+			return RX_DROP_U_REPLAY;
+		}
+
+		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+			u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+			u8 j_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+			bool aad_nonce_computed = false;
+
+			if (is_unicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) &&
+			    !ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control)) {
+				/* AAD computation */
+				memcpy(&aad[4], rx->link_addrs, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
+				/* Nonce computation */
+				ether_addr_copy(&j_0[0],
+						&rx->link_addrs[ETH_ALEN]);
+				aad_nonce_computed = true;
+			}
+			/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+			gcmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, j_0, aad,
+					    key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SPP_AMSDU,
+					    aad_nonce_computed);
+
+			if (ieee80211_aes_gcm_decrypt(
+				    key->u.gcmp.tfm, j_0, aad,
+				    skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN,
+				    data_len,
+				    skb->data + skb->len -
+				    IEEE80211_GCMP_MIC_LEN))
+				return RX_DROP_U_MIC_FAIL;
+		}
+
+		memcpy(key->u.gcmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_GCMP_PN_LEN);
+		if (unlikely(ieee80211_is_frag(hdr)))
+			memcpy(rx->ccm_gcm.pn, pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
+	}
+
+	/* Remove GCMP header and MIC */
+	if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - mic_len))
+		return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_GCMP_MIC;
+	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
+	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_GCMP_HDR_LEN);
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
+{
+	__le16 mask_fc;
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+
+	/* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
+
+	/* FC type/subtype */
+	/* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
+	mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
+	mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
+				IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
+	put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
+	/* A1 || A2 || A3 */
+	memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addrs, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
+}
+
+
+static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
+{
+	*d++ = pn;
+	*d++ = pn >> 8;
+	*d++ = pn >> 16;
+	*d++ = pn >> 24;
+	*d++ = pn >> 32;
+	*d = pn >> 40;
+}
+
+static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
+{
+	*d++ = s[5];
+	*d++ = s[4];
+	*d++ = s[3];
+	*d++ = s[2];
+	*d++ = s[1];
+	*d = s[0];
+}
+
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
+				  unsigned int mic_len)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_mmie_var *mmie;
+	size_t mmie_len;
+	u8 aad[20];
+	u64 pn64;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
+
+	info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIE))
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+
+	mmie_len = sizeof(*mmie) + mic_len;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < mmie_len))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	mmie = skb_put(skb, mmie_len);
+	mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
+	mmie->length = mmie_len - 2;
+	mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
+
+	/* PN = PN + 1 */
+	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
+
+	bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+
+	bip_aad(skb, aad);
+
+	ieee80211_aes_cmac(&key->u.aes_cmac.key, aad, skb->data + 24,
+			   skb->len - 24, mmie->mic, mic_len);
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx,
+				  unsigned int mic_len)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_mmie_var *mmie;
+	size_t mmie_len;
+	u8 aad[20], mic[IEEE80211_CMAC_256_MIC_LEN], ipn[6];
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	mmie_len = sizeof(*mmie) + mic_len;
+
+	/* management frames are already linear */
+
+	if (skb->len < 24 + mmie_len)
+		return mic_len == IEEE80211_CMAC_128_MIC_LEN ?
+			RX_DROP_U_SHORT_CMAC : RX_DROP_U_SHORT_CMAC256;
+
+	mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_var *)(skb->data + skb->len - mmie_len);
+	if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
+	    mmie->length != mmie_len - 2)
+		return RX_DROP_U_BAD_MMIE; /* Invalid MMIE */
+
+	bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
+
+	if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
+		key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
+		return RX_DROP_U_REPLAY;
+	}
+
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+		bip_aad(skb, aad);
+		ieee80211_aes_cmac(&key->u.aes_cmac.key, aad, skb->data + 24,
+				   skb->len - 24, mic, mic_len);
+		if (crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, mic_len)) {
+			key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
+			return RX_DROP_U_MIC_FAIL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
+
+	/* Remove MMIE */
+	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - mmie_len);
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
+	u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN];
+	u64 pn64;
+	u8 nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
+
+	info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    !(key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIE))
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	mmie = skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
+	mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
+	mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
+	mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
+
+	/* PN = PN + 1 */
+	pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->conf.tx_pn);
+
+	bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
+
+	if (info->control.hw_key)
+		return TX_CONTINUE;
+
+	bip_aad(skb, aad);
+
+	hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+	bip_ipn_swap(nonce + ETH_ALEN, mmie->sequence_number);
+
+	/* MIC = AES-GMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 128) */
+	if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
+			       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic) < 0)
+		return TX_DROP;
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_aes_gmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
+	struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *mmie;
+	u8 aad[GMAC_AAD_LEN], *mic, ipn[6], nonce[GMAC_NONCE_LEN];
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	/* management frames are already linear */
+
+	if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
+		return RX_DROP_U_SHORT_GMAC;
+
+	mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie_16 *)
+		(skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
+	if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
+	    mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
+		return RX_DROP_U_BAD_MMIE; /* Invalid MMIE */
+
+	bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
+
+	if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
+		key->u.aes_gmac.replays++;
+		return RX_DROP_U_REPLAY;
+	}
+
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+		/* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
+		bip_aad(skb, aad);
+
+		memcpy(nonce, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+		memcpy(nonce + ETH_ALEN, ipn, 6);
+
+		mic = kmalloc(IEEE80211_GMAC_MIC_LEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (!mic)
+			return RX_DROP_U_OOM;
+		if (ieee80211_aes_gmac(key->u.aes_gmac.tfm, aad, nonce,
+				       skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24,
+				       mic) < 0 ||
+		    crypto_memneq(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic))) {
+			key->u.aes_gmac.icverrors++;
+			kfree(mic);
+			return RX_DROP_U_MIC_FAIL;
+		}
+		kfree(mic);
+	}
+
+	memcpy(key->u.aes_gmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
+
+	/* Remove MMIE */
+	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}