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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/mac80211/aead_api.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211/aead_api.c')
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/aead_api.c113
1 files changed, 113 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aead_api.c b/net/mac80211/aead_api.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b00d6f5b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/mac80211/aead_api.c
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright 2003-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2005-2006, Devicescape Software, Inc.
+ * Copyright 2014-2015, Qualcomm Atheros, Inc.
+ *
+ * Rewrite: Copyright (C) 2013 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+
+#include "aead_api.h"
+
+int aead_encrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
+{
+ size_t mic_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
+ struct scatterlist sg[3];
+ struct aead_request *aead_req;
+ int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
+ u8 *__aad;
+ int ret;
+
+ aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + aad_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!aead_req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ __aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize;
+ memcpy(__aad, aad, aad_len);
+
+ sg_init_table(sg, 3);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[0], __aad, aad_len);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len);
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len, b_0);
+ aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
+
+ ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
+ kfree_sensitive(aead_req);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int aead_decrypt(struct crypto_aead *tfm, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad, size_t aad_len,
+ u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
+{
+ size_t mic_len = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm);
+ struct scatterlist sg[3];
+ struct aead_request *aead_req;
+ int reqsize = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm);
+ u8 *__aad;
+ int err;
+
+ if (data_len == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ aead_req = kzalloc(reqsize + aad_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!aead_req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ __aad = (u8 *)aead_req + reqsize;
+ memcpy(__aad, aad, aad_len);
+
+ sg_init_table(sg, 3);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[0], __aad, aad_len);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[1], data, data_len);
+ sg_set_buf(&sg[2], mic, mic_len);
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, tfm);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sg, sg, data_len + mic_len, b_0);
+ aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, sg[0].length);
+
+ err = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
+ kfree_sensitive(aead_req);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+struct crypto_aead *
+aead_key_setup_encrypt(const char *alg, const u8 key[],
+ size_t key_len, size_t mic_len)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+ int err;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(alg, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return tfm;
+
+ err = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, key, key_len);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_aead;
+ err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, mic_len);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_aead;
+
+ return tfm;
+
+free_aead:
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+}
+
+void aead_key_free(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+ crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+}