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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/ipv6/protocol.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6/protocol.c')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/protocol.c70
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/protocol.c b/net/ipv6/protocol.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d4b1806ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ipv6/protocol.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX
+ * operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket
+ * interface as the means of communication with the user level.
+ *
+ * PF_INET6 protocol dispatch tables.
+ *
+ * Authors: Pedro Roque <roque@di.fc.ul.pt>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Changes:
+ *
+ * Vince Laviano (vince@cs.stanford.edu) 16 May 2001
+ * - Removed unused variable 'inet6_protocol_base'
+ * - Modified inet6_del_protocol() to correctly maintain copy bit.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <net/protocol.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+struct inet6_protocol __rcu *inet6_protos[MAX_INET_PROTOS] __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_protos);
+
+int inet6_add_protocol(const struct inet6_protocol *prot, unsigned char protocol)
+{
+ return !cmpxchg((const struct inet6_protocol **)&inet6_protos[protocol],
+ NULL, prot) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_add_protocol);
+
+int inet6_del_protocol(const struct inet6_protocol *prot, unsigned char protocol)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = (cmpxchg((const struct inet6_protocol **)&inet6_protos[protocol],
+ prot, NULL) == prot) ? 0 : -1;
+
+ synchronize_net();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_del_protocol);
+#endif
+
+const struct net_offload __rcu *inet6_offloads[MAX_INET_PROTOS] __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_offloads);
+
+int inet6_add_offload(const struct net_offload *prot, unsigned char protocol)
+{
+ return !cmpxchg((const struct net_offload **)&inet6_offloads[protocol],
+ NULL, prot) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_add_offload);
+
+int inet6_del_offload(const struct net_offload *prot, unsigned char protocol)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = (cmpxchg((const struct net_offload **)&inet6_offloads[protocol],
+ prot, NULL) == prot) ? 0 : -1;
+
+ synchronize_net();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet6_del_offload);