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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c46
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e43ea9492
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/icmpv6.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT)
+
+#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h>
+void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info)
+{
+ struct inet6_skb_parm parm = { 0 };
+ struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL;
+ enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
+ enum ip_conntrack_dir dir;
+ struct in6_addr orig_ip;
+ struct nf_conn *ct;
+
+ ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo);
+ if (!ct || !(READ_ONCE(ct->status) & IPS_NAT_MASK)) {
+ icmp6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, NULL, &parm);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (skb_shared(skb_in))
+ skb_in = cloned_skb = skb_clone(skb_in, GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+ if (unlikely(!skb_in || skb_network_header(skb_in) < skb_in->head ||
+ (skb_network_header(skb_in) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) >
+ skb_tail_pointer(skb_in) || skb_ensure_writable(skb_in,
+ skb_network_offset(skb_in) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr))))
+ goto out;
+
+ orig_ip = ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr;
+ dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo);
+ ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u3.in6;
+ icmp6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, NULL, &parm);
+ ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip;
+out:
+ consume_skb(cloned_skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_ndo_send);
+#endif