diff options
| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c | 46 |
1 files changed, 46 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e43ea9492 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_icmp.c @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/export.h> +#include <linux/icmpv6.h> +#include <linux/mutex.h> +#include <linux/netdevice.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> + +#include <net/ipv6.h> + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NF_NAT) + +#include <net/netfilter/nf_conntrack.h> +void icmpv6_ndo_send(struct sk_buff *skb_in, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info) +{ + struct inet6_skb_parm parm = { 0 }; + struct sk_buff *cloned_skb = NULL; + enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo; + enum ip_conntrack_dir dir; + struct in6_addr orig_ip; + struct nf_conn *ct; + + ct = nf_ct_get(skb_in, &ctinfo); + if (!ct || !(READ_ONCE(ct->status) & IPS_NAT_MASK)) { + icmp6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, NULL, &parm); + return; + } + + if (skb_shared(skb_in)) + skb_in = cloned_skb = skb_clone(skb_in, GFP_ATOMIC); + + if (unlikely(!skb_in || skb_network_header(skb_in) < skb_in->head || + (skb_network_header(skb_in) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)) > + skb_tail_pointer(skb_in) || skb_ensure_writable(skb_in, + skb_network_offset(skb_in) + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr)))) + goto out; + + orig_ip = ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr; + dir = CTINFO2DIR(ctinfo); + ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.u3.in6; + icmp6_send(skb_in, type, code, info, NULL, &parm); + ipv6_hdr(skb_in)->saddr = orig_ip; +out: + consume_skb(cloned_skb); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(icmpv6_ndo_send); +#endif |
