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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/ipv4/protocol.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/protocol.c')
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/protocol.c70
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/protocol.c b/net/ipv4/protocol.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..691397994
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ipv4/protocol.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX
+ * operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket
+ * interface as the means of communication with the user level.
+ *
+ * INET protocol dispatch tables.
+ *
+ * Authors: Ross Biro
+ * Fred N. van Kempen, <waltje@uWalt.NL.Mugnet.ORG>
+ *
+ * Fixes:
+ * Alan Cox : Ahah! udp icmp errors don't work because
+ * udp_err is never called!
+ * Alan Cox : Added new fields for init and ready for
+ * proper fragmentation (_NO_ 4K limits!)
+ * Richard Colella : Hang on hash collision
+ * Vince Laviano : Modified inet_del_protocol() to correctly
+ * maintain copy bit.
+ */
+#include <linux/cache.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <net/protocol.h>
+
+struct net_protocol __rcu *inet_protos[MAX_INET_PROTOS] __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_protos);
+const struct net_offload __rcu *inet_offloads[MAX_INET_PROTOS] __read_mostly;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_offloads);
+
+int inet_add_protocol(const struct net_protocol *prot, unsigned char protocol)
+{
+ return !cmpxchg((const struct net_protocol **)&inet_protos[protocol],
+ NULL, prot) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_add_protocol);
+
+int inet_add_offload(const struct net_offload *prot, unsigned char protocol)
+{
+ return !cmpxchg((const struct net_offload **)&inet_offloads[protocol],
+ NULL, prot) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_add_offload);
+
+int inet_del_protocol(const struct net_protocol *prot, unsigned char protocol)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = (cmpxchg((const struct net_protocol **)&inet_protos[protocol],
+ prot, NULL) == prot) ? 0 : -1;
+
+ synchronize_net();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_del_protocol);
+
+int inet_del_offload(const struct net_offload *prot, unsigned char protocol)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = (cmpxchg((const struct net_offload **)&inet_offloads[protocol],
+ prot, NULL) == prot) ? 0 : -1;
+
+ synchronize_net();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_del_offload);