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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/ipv4/protocol.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/protocol.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/protocol.c | 70 |
1 files changed, 70 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/protocol.c b/net/ipv4/protocol.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..691397994 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/ipv4/protocol.c @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* + * INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX + * operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket + * interface as the means of communication with the user level. + * + * INET protocol dispatch tables. + * + * Authors: Ross Biro + * Fred N. van Kempen, <waltje@uWalt.NL.Mugnet.ORG> + * + * Fixes: + * Alan Cox : Ahah! udp icmp errors don't work because + * udp_err is never called! + * Alan Cox : Added new fields for init and ready for + * proper fragmentation (_NO_ 4K limits!) + * Richard Colella : Hang on hash collision + * Vince Laviano : Modified inet_del_protocol() to correctly + * maintain copy bit. + */ +#include <linux/cache.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/netdevice.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> +#include <net/protocol.h> + +struct net_protocol __rcu *inet_protos[MAX_INET_PROTOS] __read_mostly; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_protos); +const struct net_offload __rcu *inet_offloads[MAX_INET_PROTOS] __read_mostly; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_offloads); + +int inet_add_protocol(const struct net_protocol *prot, unsigned char protocol) +{ + return !cmpxchg((const struct net_protocol **)&inet_protos[protocol], + NULL, prot) ? 0 : -1; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_add_protocol); + +int inet_add_offload(const struct net_offload *prot, unsigned char protocol) +{ + return !cmpxchg((const struct net_offload **)&inet_offloads[protocol], + NULL, prot) ? 0 : -1; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_add_offload); + +int inet_del_protocol(const struct net_protocol *prot, unsigned char protocol) +{ + int ret; + + ret = (cmpxchg((const struct net_protocol **)&inet_protos[protocol], + prot, NULL) == prot) ? 0 : -1; + + synchronize_net(); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_del_protocol); + +int inet_del_offload(const struct net_offload *prot, unsigned char protocol) +{ + int ret; + + ret = (cmpxchg((const struct net_offload **)&inet_offloads[protocol], + prot, NULL) == prot) ? 0 : -1; + + synchronize_net(); + + return ret; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_del_offload); |
