openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 90 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/ipv4/metrics.c b/net/ipv4/metrics.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ad40762a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ipv4/metrics.c
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/tcp.h>
+
+static int ip_metrics_convert(struct nlattr *fc_mx,
+			      int fc_mx_len, u32 *metrics,
+			      struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
+{
+	bool ecn_ca = false;
+	struct nlattr *nla;
+	int remaining;
+
+	nla_for_each_attr(nla, fc_mx, fc_mx_len, remaining) {
+		int type = nla_type(nla);
+		u32 val;
+
+		if (!type)
+			continue;
+		if (type > RTAX_MAX) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid metric type");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+
+		type = array_index_nospec(type, RTAX_MAX + 1);
+		if (type == RTAX_CC_ALGO) {
+			char tmp[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
+
+			nla_strscpy(tmp, nla, sizeof(tmp));
+			val = tcp_ca_get_key_by_name(tmp, &ecn_ca);
+			if (val == TCP_CA_UNSPEC) {
+				NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Unknown tcp congestion algorithm");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (nla_len(nla) != sizeof(u32)) {
+				NL_SET_ERR_MSG_ATTR(extack, nla,
+						    "Invalid attribute in metrics");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			val = nla_get_u32(nla);
+		}
+		if (type == RTAX_ADVMSS && val > 65535 - 40)
+			val = 65535 - 40;
+		if (type == RTAX_MTU && val > 65535 - 15)
+			val = 65535 - 15;
+		if (type == RTAX_HOPLIMIT && val > 255)
+			val = 255;
+		if (type == RTAX_FEATURES && (val & ~RTAX_FEATURE_MASK)) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Unknown flag set in feature mask in metrics attribute");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		metrics[type - 1] = val;
+	}
+
+	if (ecn_ca)
+		metrics[RTAX_FEATURES - 1] |= DST_FEATURE_ECN_CA;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct dst_metrics *ip_fib_metrics_init(struct nlattr *fc_mx,
+					int fc_mx_len,
+					struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
+{
+	struct dst_metrics *fib_metrics;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!fc_mx)
+		return (struct dst_metrics *)&dst_default_metrics;
+
+	fib_metrics = kzalloc_obj(*fib_metrics);
+	if (unlikely(!fib_metrics))
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	err = ip_metrics_convert(fc_mx, fc_mx_len, fib_metrics->metrics,
+				 extack);
+	if (!err) {
+		refcount_set(&fib_metrics->refcnt, 1);
+	} else {
+		kfree(fib_metrics);
+		fib_metrics = ERR_PTR(err);
+	}
+
+	return fib_metrics;
+}