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authorJinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200
commita5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch)
tree73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /net/handshake/handshake.h
downloadlinux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz
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x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'net/handshake/handshake.h')
-rw-r--r--net/handshake/handshake.h95
1 files changed, 95 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/handshake/handshake.h b/net/handshake/handshake.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..da61cadd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/handshake/handshake.h
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Generic netlink handshake service
+ *
+ * Author: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2023, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _INTERNAL_HANDSHAKE_H
+#define _INTERNAL_HANDSHAKE_H
+
+/* Per-net namespace context */
+struct handshake_net {
+ spinlock_t hn_lock; /* protects next 3 fields */
+ int hn_pending;
+ int hn_pending_max;
+ struct list_head hn_requests;
+
+ unsigned long hn_flags;
+};
+
+enum hn_flags_bits {
+ HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING,
+};
+
+struct file;
+struct handshake_proto;
+
+/* One handshake request */
+struct handshake_req {
+ struct list_head hr_list;
+ struct rhash_head hr_rhash;
+ unsigned long hr_flags;
+ const struct handshake_proto *hr_proto;
+ struct file *hr_file;
+ struct sock *hr_sk;
+ void (*hr_odestruct)(struct sock *sk);
+
+ /* Always the last field */
+ char hr_priv[];
+};
+
+enum hr_flags_bits {
+ HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED,
+ HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_SESSION,
+};
+
+struct genl_info;
+
+/* Invariants for all handshake requests for one transport layer
+ * security protocol
+ */
+struct handshake_proto {
+ int hp_handler_class;
+ size_t hp_privsize;
+ unsigned long hp_flags;
+
+ int (*hp_accept)(struct handshake_req *req,
+ struct genl_info *info, int fd);
+ void (*hp_done)(struct handshake_req *req,
+ int status,
+ struct genl_info *info);
+ void (*hp_destroy)(struct handshake_req *req);
+};
+
+enum hp_flags_bits {
+ HANDSHAKE_F_PROTO_NOTIFY,
+};
+
+/* alert.c */
+int tls_alert_send(struct socket *sock, u8 level, u8 description);
+
+/* netlink.c */
+int handshake_genl_notify(struct net *net, const struct handshake_proto *proto,
+ gfp_t flags);
+struct nlmsghdr *handshake_genl_put(struct sk_buff *msg,
+ struct genl_info *info);
+struct handshake_net *handshake_pernet(struct net *net);
+
+/* request.c */
+struct handshake_req *handshake_req_alloc(const struct handshake_proto *proto,
+ gfp_t flags);
+int handshake_req_hash_init(void);
+void handshake_req_hash_destroy(void);
+void *handshake_req_private(struct handshake_req *req);
+struct handshake_req *handshake_req_hash_lookup(struct sock *sk);
+struct handshake_req *handshake_req_next(struct handshake_net *hn, int class);
+int handshake_req_submit(struct socket *sock, struct handshake_req *req,
+ gfp_t flags);
+void handshake_complete(struct handshake_req *req, int status,
+ struct genl_info *info);
+bool handshake_req_cancel(struct sock *sk);
+
+#endif /* _INTERNAL_HANDSHAKE_H */