openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 94 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/ethtool/phc_vclocks.c b/net/ethtool/phc_vclocks.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..15146e38a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ethtool/phc_vclocks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright 2021 NXP
+ */
+#include "common.h"
+#include "netlink.h"
+
+struct phc_vclocks_req_info {
+	struct ethnl_req_info		base;
+};
+
+struct phc_vclocks_reply_data {
+	struct ethnl_reply_data		base;
+	int				num;
+	int				*index;
+};
+
+#define PHC_VCLOCKS_REPDATA(__reply_base) \
+	container_of(__reply_base, struct phc_vclocks_reply_data, base)
+
+const struct nla_policy ethnl_phc_vclocks_get_policy[] = {
+	[ETHTOOL_A_PHC_VCLOCKS_HEADER] = NLA_POLICY_NESTED(ethnl_header_policy),
+};
+
+static int phc_vclocks_prepare_data(const struct ethnl_req_info *req_base,
+				    struct ethnl_reply_data *reply_base,
+				    const struct genl_info *info)
+{
+	struct phc_vclocks_reply_data *data = PHC_VCLOCKS_REPDATA(reply_base);
+	struct net_device *dev = reply_base->dev;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = ethnl_ops_begin(dev);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	data->num = ethtool_get_phc_vclocks(dev, &data->index);
+	ethnl_ops_complete(dev);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int phc_vclocks_reply_size(const struct ethnl_req_info *req_base,
+				  const struct ethnl_reply_data *reply_base)
+{
+	const struct phc_vclocks_reply_data *data =
+		PHC_VCLOCKS_REPDATA(reply_base);
+	int len = 0;
+
+	if (data->num > 0) {
+		len += nla_total_size(sizeof(u32));
+		len += nla_total_size(sizeof(s32) * data->num);
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+static int phc_vclocks_fill_reply(struct sk_buff *skb,
+				  const struct ethnl_req_info *req_base,
+				  const struct ethnl_reply_data *reply_base)
+{
+	const struct phc_vclocks_reply_data *data =
+		PHC_VCLOCKS_REPDATA(reply_base);
+
+	if (data->num <= 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (nla_put_u32(skb, ETHTOOL_A_PHC_VCLOCKS_NUM, data->num) ||
+	    nla_put(skb, ETHTOOL_A_PHC_VCLOCKS_INDEX,
+		    sizeof(s32) * data->num, data->index))
+		return -EMSGSIZE;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void phc_vclocks_cleanup_data(struct ethnl_reply_data *reply_base)
+{
+	const struct phc_vclocks_reply_data *data =
+		PHC_VCLOCKS_REPDATA(reply_base);
+
+	kfree(data->index);
+}
+
+const struct ethnl_request_ops ethnl_phc_vclocks_request_ops = {
+	.request_cmd		= ETHTOOL_MSG_PHC_VCLOCKS_GET,
+	.reply_cmd		= ETHTOOL_MSG_PHC_VCLOCKS_GET_REPLY,
+	.hdr_attr		= ETHTOOL_A_PHC_VCLOCKS_HEADER,
+	.req_info_size		= sizeof(struct phc_vclocks_req_info),
+	.reply_data_size	= sizeof(struct phc_vclocks_reply_data),
+
+	.prepare_data		= phc_vclocks_prepare_data,
+	.reply_size		= phc_vclocks_reply_size,
+	.fill_reply		= phc_vclocks_fill_reply,
+	.cleanup_data		= phc_vclocks_cleanup_data,
+};