openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted

sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.

    l.lwz   r29,0(r4)
    l.lwz   r27,0(r5)
    l.sw    0(r4),r27
    l.sw    0(r5),r29

The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.

A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.

This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.

Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.

[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>

1 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/ethtool/Makefile b/net/ethtool/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..629c10916
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ethtool/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+obj-y				+= ioctl.o common.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_ETHTOOL_NETLINK)	+= ethtool_nl.o
+
+ethtool_nl-y	:= netlink.o bitset.o strset.o linkinfo.o linkmodes.o rss.o \
+		   linkstate.o debug.o wol.o features.o privflags.o rings.o \
+		   channels.o coalesce.o pause.o eee.o tsinfo.o cabletest.o \
+		   tunnels.o fec.o eeprom.o stats.o phc_vclocks.o mm.o \
+		   module.o cmis_fw_update.o cmis_cdb.o pse-pd.o plca.o \
+		   phy.o tsconfig.o mse.o