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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/dsa/netlink.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/dsa/netlink.c')
-rw-r--r--net/dsa/netlink.c64
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/dsa/netlink.c b/net/dsa/netlink.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1332e5634
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/dsa/netlink.c
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright 2022 NXP
+ */
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <net/rtnetlink.h>
+
+#include "netlink.h"
+#include "user.h"
+
+static const struct nla_policy dsa_policy[IFLA_DSA_MAX + 1] = {
+ [IFLA_DSA_CONDUIT] = { .type = NLA_U32 },
+};
+
+static int dsa_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[],
+ struct nlattr *data[],
+ struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (!data)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (data[IFLA_DSA_CONDUIT]) {
+ u32 ifindex = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_DSA_CONDUIT]);
+ struct net_device *conduit;
+
+ conduit = __dev_get_by_index(dev_net(dev), ifindex);
+ if (!conduit)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = dsa_user_change_conduit(dev, conduit, extack);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static size_t dsa_get_size(const struct net_device *dev)
+{
+ return nla_total_size(sizeof(u32)) + /* IFLA_DSA_CONDUIT */
+ 0;
+}
+
+static int dsa_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *dev)
+{
+ struct net_device *conduit = dsa_user_to_conduit(dev);
+
+ if (nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_DSA_CONDUIT, conduit->ifindex))
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct rtnl_link_ops dsa_link_ops __read_mostly = {
+ .kind = "dsa",
+ .priv_size = sizeof(struct dsa_port),
+ .maxtype = IFLA_DSA_MAX,
+ .policy = dsa_policy,
+ .changelink = dsa_changelink,
+ .get_size = dsa_get_size,
+ .fill_info = dsa_fill_info,
+ .netns_refund = true,
+};