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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/dsa/netlink.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/dsa/netlink.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/dsa/netlink.c | 64 |
1 files changed, 64 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/dsa/netlink.c b/net/dsa/netlink.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1332e5634 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/dsa/netlink.c @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright 2022 NXP + */ +#include <linux/netdevice.h> +#include <net/rtnetlink.h> + +#include "netlink.h" +#include "user.h" + +static const struct nla_policy dsa_policy[IFLA_DSA_MAX + 1] = { + [IFLA_DSA_CONDUIT] = { .type = NLA_U32 }, +}; + +static int dsa_changelink(struct net_device *dev, struct nlattr *tb[], + struct nlattr *data[], + struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) +{ + int err; + + if (!data) + return 0; + + if (data[IFLA_DSA_CONDUIT]) { + u32 ifindex = nla_get_u32(data[IFLA_DSA_CONDUIT]); + struct net_device *conduit; + + conduit = __dev_get_by_index(dev_net(dev), ifindex); + if (!conduit) + return -EINVAL; + + err = dsa_user_change_conduit(dev, conduit, extack); + if (err) + return err; + } + + return 0; +} + +static size_t dsa_get_size(const struct net_device *dev) +{ + return nla_total_size(sizeof(u32)) + /* IFLA_DSA_CONDUIT */ + 0; +} + +static int dsa_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct net_device *dev) +{ + struct net_device *conduit = dsa_user_to_conduit(dev); + + if (nla_put_u32(skb, IFLA_DSA_CONDUIT, conduit->ifindex)) + return -EMSGSIZE; + + return 0; +} + +struct rtnl_link_ops dsa_link_ops __read_mostly = { + .kind = "dsa", + .priv_size = sizeof(struct dsa_port), + .maxtype = IFLA_DSA_MAX, + .policy = dsa_policy, + .changelink = dsa_changelink, + .get_size = dsa_get_size, + .fill_info = dsa_fill_info, + .netns_refund = true, +}; |
