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authorJinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com>2026-09-08 15:37:42 +0800
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2026-09-17 09:48:42 +0200
commita5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255 (patch)
tree73fef824f9a846cf935869d0dbc5070ef6e2f741 /net/ceph/decode.c
downloadlinux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.tar.gz
linux-stable-a5f7a5bb3b7f28ba7e4fa246775b29a0e5537255.zip
x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructionsgrafted
When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ] Fixes: 6256e668b7af ("x86/kprobes: Use int3 instead of debug trap for single-step") Suggested-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jinke Han <jinkehan@didiglobal.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260908073742.GA10517@didi-ThinkCentre-M920t-N000
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ceph/decode.c')
-rw-r--r--net/ceph/decode.c193
1 files changed, 193 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/decode.c b/net/ceph/decode.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2f21af38c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ceph/decode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h>
+
+#include <linux/inet.h>
+
+#include <linux/ceph/decode.h>
+#include <linux/ceph/messenger.h> /* for ceph_pr_addr() */
+
+static int
+ceph_decode_entity_addr_versioned(void **p, void *end,
+ struct ceph_entity_addr *addr)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u8 struct_v;
+ u32 struct_len, addr_len;
+ void *struct_end;
+
+ ret = ceph_start_decoding(p, end, 1, "entity_addr_t", &struct_v,
+ &struct_len);
+ if (ret)
+ goto bad;
+
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ struct_end = *p + struct_len;
+
+ ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &addr->type, sizeof(addr->type), bad);
+
+ ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &addr->nonce, sizeof(addr->nonce), bad);
+
+ ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, addr_len, bad);
+ if (addr_len > sizeof(addr->in_addr))
+ goto bad;
+
+ memset(&addr->in_addr, 0, sizeof(addr->in_addr));
+ if (addr_len) {
+ ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &addr->in_addr, addr_len, bad);
+
+ addr->in_addr.ss_family =
+ le16_to_cpu((__force __le16)addr->in_addr.ss_family);
+ }
+
+ /* Advance past anything the client doesn't yet understand */
+ *p = struct_end;
+ ret = 0;
+bad:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+ceph_decode_entity_addr_legacy(void **p, void *end,
+ struct ceph_entity_addr *addr)
+{
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Skip rest of type field */
+ ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, 3, bad);
+
+ /*
+ * Clients that don't support ADDR2 always send TYPE_NONE, change it
+ * to TYPE_LEGACY for forward compatibility.
+ */
+ addr->type = CEPH_ENTITY_ADDR_TYPE_LEGACY;
+ ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &addr->nonce, sizeof(addr->nonce), bad);
+ memset(&addr->in_addr, 0, sizeof(addr->in_addr));
+ ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &addr->in_addr,
+ sizeof(addr->in_addr), bad);
+ addr->in_addr.ss_family =
+ be16_to_cpu((__force __be16)addr->in_addr.ss_family);
+ ret = 0;
+bad:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+ceph_decode_entity_addr(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_entity_addr *addr)
+{
+ u8 marker;
+
+ ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, marker, bad);
+ if (marker == 1)
+ return ceph_decode_entity_addr_versioned(p, end, addr);
+ else if (marker == 0)
+ return ceph_decode_entity_addr_legacy(p, end, addr);
+bad:
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_decode_entity_addr);
+
+/*
+ * Return addr of desired type (MSGR2 or LEGACY) or error. In case of
+ * multiple matches, use the first one for compatibility with userspace
+ * messenger.
+ *
+ * Assume encoding with MSG_ADDR2.
+ */
+int ceph_decode_entity_addrvec(void **p, void *end, bool msgr2,
+ struct ceph_entity_addr *addr)
+{
+ __le32 my_type = msgr2 ? CEPH_ENTITY_ADDR_TYPE_MSGR2 :
+ CEPH_ENTITY_ADDR_TYPE_LEGACY;
+ struct ceph_entity_addr tmp_addr;
+ int addr_cnt;
+ bool found;
+ u8 marker;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ ceph_decode_8_safe(p, end, marker, e_inval);
+ if (marker != 2) {
+ pr_err("bad addrvec marker %d\n", marker);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, addr_cnt, e_inval);
+ dout("%s addr_cnt %d\n", __func__, addr_cnt);
+
+ found = false;
+ for (i = 0; i < addr_cnt; i++) {
+ ret = ceph_decode_entity_addr(p, end, &tmp_addr);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ dout("%s i %d addr %s\n", __func__, i, ceph_pr_addr(&tmp_addr));
+ if (tmp_addr.type == my_type) {
+ if (!found) {
+ memcpy(addr, &tmp_addr, sizeof(*addr));
+ found = true;
+ } else {
+ dout("%s skipping extra match of type %d in addrvec\n",
+ __func__, le32_to_cpu(my_type));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (found)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!addr_cnt)
+ return 0; /* normal -- e.g. unused OSD id/slot */
+
+ if (addr_cnt == 1 && !memchr_inv(&tmp_addr, 0, sizeof(tmp_addr)))
+ return 0; /* weird but effectively the same as !addr_cnt */
+
+ pr_err("no match of type %d in addrvec\n", le32_to_cpu(my_type));
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+e_inval:
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_decode_entity_addrvec);
+
+static int get_sockaddr_encoding_len(sa_family_t family)
+{
+ union {
+ struct sockaddr sa;
+ struct sockaddr_in sin;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
+ } u;
+
+ switch (family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ return sizeof(u.sin);
+ case AF_INET6:
+ return sizeof(u.sin6);
+ default:
+ return sizeof(u);
+ }
+}
+
+int ceph_entity_addr_encoding_len(const struct ceph_entity_addr *addr)
+{
+ sa_family_t family = get_unaligned(&addr->in_addr.ss_family);
+ int addr_len = get_sockaddr_encoding_len(family);
+
+ return 1 + CEPH_ENCODING_START_BLK_LEN + 4 + 4 + 4 + addr_len;
+}
+
+void ceph_encode_entity_addr(void **p, const struct ceph_entity_addr *addr)
+{
+ sa_family_t family = get_unaligned(&addr->in_addr.ss_family);
+ int addr_len = get_sockaddr_encoding_len(family);
+
+ ceph_encode_8(p, 1); /* marker */
+ ceph_start_encoding(p, 1, 1, sizeof(addr->type) +
+ sizeof(addr->nonce) +
+ sizeof(u32) + addr_len);
+ ceph_encode_copy(p, &addr->type, sizeof(addr->type));
+ ceph_encode_copy(p, &addr->nonce, sizeof(addr->nonce));
+
+ ceph_encode_32(p, addr_len);
+ ceph_encode_16(p, family);
+ ceph_encode_copy(p, addr->in_addr.__data, addr_len - sizeof(family));
+}