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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/ceph/crypto.h
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linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ceph/crypto.h')
-rw-r--r--net/ceph/crypto.h53
1 files changed, 53 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.h b/net/ceph/crypto.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3a2ade15a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ceph/crypto.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _FS_CEPH_CRYPTO_H
+#define _FS_CEPH_CRYPTO_H
+
+#include <crypto/sha2.h>
+#include <linux/ceph/types.h>
+#include <linux/ceph/buffer.h>
+
+#define CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN 32
+#define CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN 64
+
+/*
+ * cryptographic secret
+ */
+struct ceph_crypto_key {
+ int type;
+ struct ceph_timespec created;
+ int len;
+ void *key;
+
+ union {
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *aes_tfm;
+ struct {
+ struct hmac_sha256_key hmac_key;
+ const struct krb5_enctype *krb5_type;
+ struct crypto_aead *krb5_tfms[3];
+ };
+ };
+};
+
+int ceph_crypto_key_prepare(struct ceph_crypto_key *key,
+ const u32 *key_usages, int key_usage_cnt);
+int ceph_crypto_key_clone(struct ceph_crypto_key *dst,
+ const struct ceph_crypto_key *src);
+int ceph_crypto_key_decode(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void **p, void *end);
+int ceph_crypto_key_unarmor(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const char *in);
+void ceph_crypto_key_destroy(struct ceph_crypto_key *key);
+
+/* crypto.c */
+int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int usage_slot, bool encrypt,
+ void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len);
+int ceph_crypt_data_offset(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key);
+int ceph_crypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int data_len);
+void ceph_hmac_sha256(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const void *buf,
+ int buf_len, u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+int ceph_crypto_init(void);
+void ceph_crypto_shutdown(void);
+
+/* armor.c */
+int ceph_armor(char *dst, const char *src, const char *end);
+int ceph_unarmor(char *dst, const char *src, const char *end);
+
+#endif