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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/ceph/ceph_strings.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ceph/ceph_strings.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ceph/ceph_strings.c | 90 |
1 files changed, 90 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/ceph_strings.c b/net/ceph/ceph_strings.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..355fea272 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/ceph/ceph_strings.c @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Ceph string constants + */ +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/ceph/types.h> + +const char *ceph_entity_type_name(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_MDS: return "mds"; + case CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_OSD: return "osd"; + case CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_MON: return "mon"; + case CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_CLIENT: return "client"; + case CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_AUTH: return "auth"; + default: return "unknown"; + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_entity_type_name); + +const char *ceph_auth_proto_name(int proto) +{ + switch (proto) { + case CEPH_AUTH_UNKNOWN: + return "unknown"; + case CEPH_AUTH_NONE: + return "none"; + case CEPH_AUTH_CEPHX: + return "cephx"; + default: + return "???"; + } +} + +const char *ceph_con_mode_name(int mode) +{ + switch (mode) { + case CEPH_CON_MODE_UNKNOWN: + return "unknown"; + case CEPH_CON_MODE_CRC: + return "crc"; + case CEPH_CON_MODE_SECURE: + return "secure"; + default: + return "???"; + } +} + +const char *ceph_osd_op_name(int op) +{ + switch (op) { +#define GENERATE_CASE(op, opcode, str) case CEPH_OSD_OP_##op: return (str); +__CEPH_FORALL_OSD_OPS(GENERATE_CASE) +#undef GENERATE_CASE + default: + return "???"; + } +} + +const char *ceph_osd_watch_op_name(int o) +{ + switch (o) { + case CEPH_OSD_WATCH_OP_UNWATCH: + return "unwatch"; + case CEPH_OSD_WATCH_OP_WATCH: + return "watch"; + case CEPH_OSD_WATCH_OP_RECONNECT: + return "reconnect"; + case CEPH_OSD_WATCH_OP_PING: + return "ping"; + default: + return "???"; + } +} + +const char *ceph_osd_state_name(int s) +{ + switch (s) { + case CEPH_OSD_EXISTS: + return "exists"; + case CEPH_OSD_UP: + return "up"; + case CEPH_OSD_AUTOOUT: + return "autoout"; + case CEPH_OSD_NEW: + return "new"; + default: + return "???"; + } +} |
