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authorMuhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200
commitff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch)
treec38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/ceph/buffer.c
downloadlinux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz
linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never actually checks it before indexing into the frame body: const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr); ... c = frame_body[0]; ... a = frame_body[1]; frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read. This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through. Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ceph/buffer.c')
-rw-r--r--net/ceph/buffer.c59
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/buffer.c b/net/ceph/buffer.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..98c2ac438
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ceph/buffer.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h>
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include <linux/ceph/buffer.h>
+#include <linux/ceph/decode.h>
+#include <linux/ceph/libceph.h> /* for kvmalloc */
+
+struct ceph_buffer *ceph_buffer_new(size_t len, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct ceph_buffer *b;
+
+ b = kmalloc_obj(*b, gfp);
+ if (!b)
+ return NULL;
+
+ b->vec.iov_base = kvmalloc(len, gfp);
+ if (!b->vec.iov_base) {
+ kfree(b);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ kref_init(&b->kref);
+ b->alloc_len = len;
+ b->vec.iov_len = len;
+ dout("buffer_new %p\n", b);
+ return b;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_buffer_new);
+
+void ceph_buffer_release(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct ceph_buffer *b = container_of(kref, struct ceph_buffer, kref);
+
+ dout("buffer_release %p\n", b);
+ kvfree(b->vec.iov_base);
+ kfree(b);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_buffer_release);
+
+int ceph_decode_buffer(struct ceph_buffer **b, void **p, void *end)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ ceph_decode_need(p, end, sizeof(u32), bad);
+ len = ceph_decode_32(p);
+ dout("decode_buffer len %d\n", (int)len);
+ ceph_decode_need(p, end, len, bad);
+ *b = ceph_buffer_new(len, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!*b)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ceph_decode_copy(p, (*b)->vec.iov_base, len);
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ return -EINVAL;
+}