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| author | Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> | 2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> | 2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100 |
| commit | 78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch) | |
| tree | 137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /net/ceph/buffer.c | |
| download | linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip | |
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style]
Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ceph/buffer.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ceph/buffer.c | 59 |
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/buffer.c b/net/ceph/buffer.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..98c2ac438 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/ceph/buffer.c @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h> + +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> + +#include <linux/ceph/buffer.h> +#include <linux/ceph/decode.h> +#include <linux/ceph/libceph.h> /* for kvmalloc */ + +struct ceph_buffer *ceph_buffer_new(size_t len, gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct ceph_buffer *b; + + b = kmalloc_obj(*b, gfp); + if (!b) + return NULL; + + b->vec.iov_base = kvmalloc(len, gfp); + if (!b->vec.iov_base) { + kfree(b); + return NULL; + } + + kref_init(&b->kref); + b->alloc_len = len; + b->vec.iov_len = len; + dout("buffer_new %p\n", b); + return b; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_buffer_new); + +void ceph_buffer_release(struct kref *kref) +{ + struct ceph_buffer *b = container_of(kref, struct ceph_buffer, kref); + + dout("buffer_release %p\n", b); + kvfree(b->vec.iov_base); + kfree(b); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_buffer_release); + +int ceph_decode_buffer(struct ceph_buffer **b, void **p, void *end) +{ + size_t len; + + ceph_decode_need(p, end, sizeof(u32), bad); + len = ceph_decode_32(p); + dout("decode_buffer len %d\n", (int)len); + ceph_decode_need(p, end, len, bad); + *b = ceph_buffer_new(len, GFP_NOFS); + if (!*b) + return -ENOMEM; + ceph_decode_copy(p, (*b)->vec.iov_base, len); + return 0; +bad: + return -EINVAL; +} |
