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authorAli Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com>2026-08-21 01:45:27 +0000
committerStafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>2026-08-29 07:32:26 +0100
commit78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7 (patch)
tree137c22dd795222931b9d2bf2501d37cd766741aa /net/ceph/buffer.c
downloadlinux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.tar.gz
linux-stable-78004e9a87f240df03e2f73120d291763c32e0a7.zip
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscallgrafted
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written assembly. l.lwz r29,0(r4) l.lwz r27,0(r5) l.sw 0(r4),r27 l.sw 0(r5),r29 The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory accesses also have no exception table entries. A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall reads from and writes to it directly. This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code execution in kernel context. Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user addresses return -EFAULT. [shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] Fixes: 9d02a4283e9c ("OpenRISC: Boot code") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ali Ahmet Memis <ali@iusegentoo.com> Signed-off-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ceph/buffer.c')
-rw-r--r--net/ceph/buffer.c59
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/buffer.c b/net/ceph/buffer.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..98c2ac438
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ceph/buffer.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h>
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include <linux/ceph/buffer.h>
+#include <linux/ceph/decode.h>
+#include <linux/ceph/libceph.h> /* for kvmalloc */
+
+struct ceph_buffer *ceph_buffer_new(size_t len, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct ceph_buffer *b;
+
+ b = kmalloc_obj(*b, gfp);
+ if (!b)
+ return NULL;
+
+ b->vec.iov_base = kvmalloc(len, gfp);
+ if (!b->vec.iov_base) {
+ kfree(b);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ kref_init(&b->kref);
+ b->alloc_len = len;
+ b->vec.iov_len = len;
+ dout("buffer_new %p\n", b);
+ return b;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_buffer_new);
+
+void ceph_buffer_release(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct ceph_buffer *b = container_of(kref, struct ceph_buffer, kref);
+
+ dout("buffer_release %p\n", b);
+ kvfree(b->vec.iov_base);
+ kfree(b);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_buffer_release);
+
+int ceph_decode_buffer(struct ceph_buffer **b, void **p, void *end)
+{
+ size_t len;
+
+ ceph_decode_need(p, end, sizeof(u32), bad);
+ len = ceph_decode_32(p);
+ dout("decode_buffer len %d\n", (int)len);
+ ceph_decode_need(p, end, len, bad);
+ *b = ceph_buffer_new(len, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!*b)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ ceph_decode_copy(p, (*b)->vec.iov_base, len);
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ return -EINVAL;
+}