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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:55 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (patch) | |
| tree | c38fd8fcf58e1937b17fdbc6518b6f8b797fc15a /net/ceph/auth_none.c | |
| download | linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.tar.gz linux-stable-ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()grafted
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-3-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ceph/auth_none.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ceph/auth_none.c | 146 |
1 files changed, 146 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/auth_none.c b/net/ceph/auth_none.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..99e1f3e10 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/ceph/auth_none.c @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h> + +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> + +#include <linux/ceph/decode.h> +#include <linux/ceph/auth.h> + +#include "auth_none.h" + +static void reset(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) +{ + struct ceph_auth_none_info *xi = ac->private; + + xi->starting = true; +} + +static void destroy(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) +{ + kfree(ac->private); + ac->private = NULL; +} + +static int is_authenticated(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) +{ + struct ceph_auth_none_info *xi = ac->private; + + return !xi->starting; +} + +static int should_authenticate(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) +{ + struct ceph_auth_none_info *xi = ac->private; + + return xi->starting; +} + +static int ceph_auth_none_build_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, + struct ceph_none_authorizer *au) +{ + void *p = au->buf; + void *const end = p + sizeof(au->buf); + int ret; + + ceph_encode_8_safe(&p, end, 1, e_range); + ret = ceph_auth_entity_name_encode(ac->name, &p, end); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + ceph_encode_64_safe(&p, end, ac->global_id, e_range); + au->buf_len = p - (void *)au->buf; + dout("%s built authorizer len %d\n", __func__, au->buf_len); + return 0; + +e_range: + return -ERANGE; +} + +static int build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, void *buf, void *end) +{ + return 0; +} + +/* + * the generic auth code decode the global_id, and we carry no actual + * authenticate state, so nothing happens here. + */ +static int handle_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, u64 global_id, + void *buf, void *end, u8 *session_key, + int *session_key_len, u8 *con_secret, + int *con_secret_len) +{ + struct ceph_auth_none_info *xi = ac->private; + + xi->starting = false; + ceph_auth_set_global_id(ac, global_id); + return 0; +} + +static void ceph_auth_none_destroy_authorizer(struct ceph_authorizer *a) +{ + kfree(a); +} + +/* + * build an 'authorizer' with our entity_name and global_id. it is + * identical for all services we connect to. + */ +static int ceph_auth_none_create_authorizer( + struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int peer_type, + struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth) +{ + struct ceph_none_authorizer *au; + int ret; + + au = kmalloc_obj(*au, GFP_NOFS); + if (!au) + return -ENOMEM; + + au->base.destroy = ceph_auth_none_destroy_authorizer; + + ret = ceph_auth_none_build_authorizer(ac, au); + if (ret) { + kfree(au); + return ret; + } + + auth->authorizer = (struct ceph_authorizer *) au; + auth->authorizer_buf = au->buf; + auth->authorizer_buf_len = au->buf_len; + auth->authorizer_reply_buf = NULL; + auth->authorizer_reply_buf_len = 0; + + return 0; +} + +static const struct ceph_auth_client_ops ceph_auth_none_ops = { + .reset = reset, + .destroy = destroy, + .is_authenticated = is_authenticated, + .should_authenticate = should_authenticate, + .build_request = build_request, + .handle_reply = handle_reply, + .create_authorizer = ceph_auth_none_create_authorizer, +}; + +int ceph_auth_none_init(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) +{ + struct ceph_auth_none_info *xi; + + dout("ceph_auth_none_init %p\n", ac); + xi = kzalloc_obj(*xi, GFP_NOFS); + if (!xi) + return -ENOMEM; + + xi->starting = true; + + ac->protocol = CEPH_AUTH_NONE; + ac->private = xi; + ac->ops = &ceph_auth_none_ops; + return 0; +} |
