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| author | Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com> | 2026-07-28 03:16:42 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> | 2026-08-05 16:15:51 +0100 |
| commit | 1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66 (patch) | |
| tree | e8ee4ac80f87e2ad1b6b0c877eccbb62b0915c02 /net/ceph/auth_none.c | |
| download | linux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.tar.gz linux-stable-1039bffd6ae9c75b42b7d148d6c1106134107b66.zip | |
ARM: 9485/1: mm: acquire mmap write lock around show_pte() for user faultsgrafted
When CONFIG_DEBUG_USER=y, and cmdline "user_debug=31" is set,
a user fault may trigger show_pte() without any lock.
If another thread in the same process concurrently calls munmap(),
the page table pages may be freed while show_pte() is still traversing
them, causing a use-after-free in show_pte().
If CONFIG_ARM_LPAE=y, this may cause a kernel panic if the pages table
of PMD are freed when show_pte() is running.
Acquire mmap_write_lock() around show_pte() for user faults to fix the
contention.
For user faults, additionally restrict that show_pte() is called only
when the addr is a user-space address (addr < TASK_SIZE). This is because
the lock of tsk->mm only protects the virtual memory of user address space,
furthermore, dumping the page tables of a kernel-space address for user
faults is unnecessary and may have security implications.
Keep everything unchanged for kernel faults, because the kernel is
already in the "oops" state, acquiring a lock may risk a deadlock.
Co-developed-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Fixes: 6d021b724481 ("ARM: dump pgd, pmd and pte states on unhandled data abort faults")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20260716014022.2823-1-xieyuanbin1@huawei.com
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM) <ljs@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Qi Xi <xiqi2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xie Yuanbin <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ceph/auth_none.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ceph/auth_none.c | 146 |
1 files changed, 146 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/auth_none.c b/net/ceph/auth_none.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..99e1f3e10 --- /dev/null +++ b/net/ceph/auth_none.c @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h> + +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> + +#include <linux/ceph/decode.h> +#include <linux/ceph/auth.h> + +#include "auth_none.h" + +static void reset(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) +{ + struct ceph_auth_none_info *xi = ac->private; + + xi->starting = true; +} + +static void destroy(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) +{ + kfree(ac->private); + ac->private = NULL; +} + +static int is_authenticated(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) +{ + struct ceph_auth_none_info *xi = ac->private; + + return !xi->starting; +} + +static int should_authenticate(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) +{ + struct ceph_auth_none_info *xi = ac->private; + + return xi->starting; +} + +static int ceph_auth_none_build_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, + struct ceph_none_authorizer *au) +{ + void *p = au->buf; + void *const end = p + sizeof(au->buf); + int ret; + + ceph_encode_8_safe(&p, end, 1, e_range); + ret = ceph_auth_entity_name_encode(ac->name, &p, end); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + ceph_encode_64_safe(&p, end, ac->global_id, e_range); + au->buf_len = p - (void *)au->buf; + dout("%s built authorizer len %d\n", __func__, au->buf_len); + return 0; + +e_range: + return -ERANGE; +} + +static int build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, void *buf, void *end) +{ + return 0; +} + +/* + * the generic auth code decode the global_id, and we carry no actual + * authenticate state, so nothing happens here. + */ +static int handle_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, u64 global_id, + void *buf, void *end, u8 *session_key, + int *session_key_len, u8 *con_secret, + int *con_secret_len) +{ + struct ceph_auth_none_info *xi = ac->private; + + xi->starting = false; + ceph_auth_set_global_id(ac, global_id); + return 0; +} + +static void ceph_auth_none_destroy_authorizer(struct ceph_authorizer *a) +{ + kfree(a); +} + +/* + * build an 'authorizer' with our entity_name and global_id. it is + * identical for all services we connect to. + */ +static int ceph_auth_none_create_authorizer( + struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int peer_type, + struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth) +{ + struct ceph_none_authorizer *au; + int ret; + + au = kmalloc_obj(*au, GFP_NOFS); + if (!au) + return -ENOMEM; + + au->base.destroy = ceph_auth_none_destroy_authorizer; + + ret = ceph_auth_none_build_authorizer(ac, au); + if (ret) { + kfree(au); + return ret; + } + + auth->authorizer = (struct ceph_authorizer *) au; + auth->authorizer_buf = au->buf; + auth->authorizer_buf_len = au->buf_len; + auth->authorizer_reply_buf = NULL; + auth->authorizer_reply_buf_len = 0; + + return 0; +} + +static const struct ceph_auth_client_ops ceph_auth_none_ops = { + .reset = reset, + .destroy = destroy, + .is_authenticated = is_authenticated, + .should_authenticate = should_authenticate, + .build_request = build_request, + .handle_reply = handle_reply, + .create_authorizer = ceph_auth_none_create_authorizer, +}; + +int ceph_auth_none_init(struct ceph_auth_client *ac) +{ + struct ceph_auth_none_info *xi; + + dout("ceph_auth_none_init %p\n", ac); + xi = kzalloc_obj(*xi, GFP_NOFS); + if (!xi) + return -ENOMEM; + + xi->starting = true; + + ac->protocol = CEPH_AUTH_NONE; + ac->private = xi; + ac->ops = &ceph_auth_none_ops; + return 0; +} |
