Merge tag 'trace-v7.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-tracegrafted

Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:

 - Fix error output of boot instance creation failure

   Currently if a boot instance creation fails, instead of printing out
   the name of the instance that failed, it prints "(null)". That is
   because it prints "cur_str" that had already been processed by
   strsep(). Print the saved name instead.

   While at it, print the error code of the failure.

 - Fix use-after-free for same named historgrams

   Histograms can be named so that they can be used in multiple events.
   But if the named histogram has a variable attached, the second event
   that uses the named histogram which duplicates it and needs to free
   the original after duplication leaves the old variable in place and
   still visible. If another histogram uses than variable, it will use
   the stale one which will try to reference the freed duplicate
   histogram and crash the kernel.

   Free the duplicate variables along with the duplicated histogram
   data.

 - Check return value of kthread_run() in event self test

   The events self tests uses a kthread for testing but does not check
   if it succeeded in creating a kthread. If the kthread creation were
   to fail, the code will still try to call kthread_stop() on the error
   returned.

 - Fix race between reading trace_pipe and updating subbuffer size

   If a user is reading the trace_pipe file at the same time they update
   the ring buffer sub-buffer size, can cause the trace_pipe read to
   read stale data. Add trace_access_lock() around updating the ring
   buffer sub-buffer size.

 - Fix eventfs_inode on failure path in creation of the events directory

   In the creation of the "events" directory, if after allocating the
   eventfs_inode a failure is detected, it calls cleanup_ei() which
   calls free_ei(). The free_ei() will test if eventfs_inode being freed
   has no children. It is a bug if it does. But on the failure case of
   the creation of the "events" directory, the children lists have not
   yet been initialized and the free will trigger a warning because
   list_empty() on an uninitialized list returns false.

   Move the initialization into init_ei() where it makes more sense and
   makes sure that a created eventfs_inode has its lists initialized
   upon creation.

 - Check return value of kthread_run() in ftrace direct sample code

   The sample code that shows how to use the ftrace direct calls does
   not test the return of kthread_run() to see if it succeeds. Return a
   failure if the kthread_run() doesn't succeed.

 - Clear user events state on fork in case of alloc failure

   On fork, the child gets a pointer to the parent's user events state.
   It makes a copy of it then updates the child's pointer to it. But if
   the allocation fails, the duplication function leaves the child with
   a pointer to its parent's descriptor. When the child cleans up its
   data, it will free the parent's descriptor while the parent is still
   using it.

   In the duplication function, set the child's user_event_mm to NULL
   before testing if the allocation succeeded, and when it exits it will
   not free the parent's descriptor.

 - Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap

   simple_ring_buffer_swap_reader_page() starts with retry set to 8 and
   post-decrements it only after a failed link replacement. On the final
   attempt, a successful replacement leaves retry at zero, while a
   failed replacement leaves it at -1.

   But the check for success expects the retry value to be non-zero and
   exits with an error on zero. This is the opposite result. Fix it.

 - Fail nicely when the remote swap_reader_page() returns an error

   Currently, if the swap_reader_page() of a remote buffer fails, it
   triggers a WARN_ON_ONCE() and continues normally. Instead, have it
   exit with an error and a pr_warn() print instead of a full WARNING.

* tag 'trace-v7.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/trace/linux-trace:
  ring-buffer: Stop remote reader update when page swap fails
  tracing: Fix retry exhaustion in simple ring buffer reader swap
  tracing/user_events: Clear copied tracing state before fork duplication
  samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-multi-modify
  samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-modify
  eventfs: Initialize ei->children and ei->list in init_ei()
  tracing: Fix use-after-free in trace_pipe read on sub-buffer order change
  tracing: Fix crash passing ERR_PTR to kthread_stop()
  tracing: Fix use-after-free with same-name named triggers
  tracing: Fix logged instance name on creation failure

1 files changed, 661 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/ceph/auth.c b/net/ceph/auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..17660bde8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/ceph/auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,661 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h>
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include <linux/ceph/types.h>
+#include <linux/ceph/decode.h>
+#include <linux/ceph/libceph.h>
+#include <linux/ceph/messenger.h>
+#include "auth_none.h"
+#include "auth_x.h"
+
+
+/*
+ * get protocol handler
+ */
+static u32 supported_protocols[] = {
+	CEPH_AUTH_NONE,
+	CEPH_AUTH_CEPHX
+};
+
+static int init_protocol(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int proto)
+{
+	dout("%s proto %d\n", __func__, proto);
+
+	switch (proto) {
+	case CEPH_AUTH_NONE:
+		return ceph_auth_none_init(ac);
+	case CEPH_AUTH_CEPHX:
+		return ceph_x_init(ac);
+	default:
+		pr_err("bad auth protocol %d\n", proto);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+}
+
+void ceph_auth_set_global_id(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, u64 global_id)
+{
+	dout("%s global_id %llu\n", __func__, global_id);
+
+	if (!global_id)
+		pr_err("got zero global_id\n");
+
+	if (ac->global_id && global_id != ac->global_id)
+		pr_err("global_id changed from %llu to %llu\n", ac->global_id,
+		       global_id);
+
+	ac->global_id = global_id;
+}
+
+/*
+ * setup, teardown.
+ */
+struct ceph_auth_client *ceph_auth_init(const char *name,
+					const struct ceph_crypto_key *key,
+					const int *con_modes)
+{
+	struct ceph_auth_client *ac;
+
+	ac = kzalloc_obj(*ac, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!ac)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	mutex_init(&ac->mutex);
+	ac->negotiating = true;
+	if (name)
+		ac->name = name;
+	else
+		ac->name = CEPH_AUTH_NAME_DEFAULT;
+	ac->key = key;
+	ac->preferred_mode = con_modes[0];
+	ac->fallback_mode = con_modes[1];
+
+	dout("%s name '%s' preferred_mode %d fallback_mode %d\n", __func__,
+	     ac->name, ac->preferred_mode, ac->fallback_mode);
+	return ac;
+}
+
+void ceph_auth_destroy(struct ceph_auth_client *ac)
+{
+	dout("auth_destroy %p\n", ac);
+	if (ac->ops)
+		ac->ops->destroy(ac);
+	kfree(ac);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reset occurs when reconnecting to the monitor.
+ */
+void ceph_auth_reset(struct ceph_auth_client *ac)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	dout("auth_reset %p\n", ac);
+	if (ac->ops && !ac->negotiating)
+		ac->ops->reset(ac);
+	ac->negotiating = true;
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EntityName, not to be confused with entity_name_t
+ */
+int ceph_auth_entity_name_encode(const char *name, void **p, void *end)
+{
+	int len = strlen(name);
+
+	if (*p + 2*sizeof(u32) + len > end)
+		return -ERANGE;
+	ceph_encode_32(p, CEPH_ENTITY_TYPE_CLIENT);
+	ceph_encode_32(p, len);
+	ceph_encode_copy(p, name, len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initiate protocol negotiation with monitor.  Include entity name
+ * and list supported protocols.
+ */
+int ceph_auth_build_hello(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	struct ceph_mon_request_header *monhdr = buf;
+	void *p = monhdr + 1, *end = buf + len, *lenp;
+	int i, num;
+	int ret;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	dout("auth_build_hello\n");
+	monhdr->have_version = 0;
+	monhdr->session_mon = cpu_to_le16(-1);
+	monhdr->session_mon_tid = 0;
+
+	ceph_encode_32(&p, CEPH_AUTH_UNKNOWN);  /* no protocol, yet */
+
+	lenp = p;
+	p += sizeof(u32);
+
+	ceph_decode_need(&p, end, 1 + sizeof(u32), bad);
+	ceph_encode_8(&p, 1);
+	num = ARRAY_SIZE(supported_protocols);
+	ceph_encode_32(&p, num);
+	ceph_decode_need(&p, end, num * sizeof(u32), bad);
+	for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+		ceph_encode_32(&p, supported_protocols[i]);
+
+	ret = ceph_auth_entity_name_encode(ac->name, &p, end);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out;
+	ceph_decode_need(&p, end, sizeof(u64), bad);
+	ceph_encode_64(&p, ac->global_id);
+
+	ceph_encode_32(&lenp, p - lenp - sizeof(u32));
+	ret = p - buf;
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return ret;
+
+bad:
+	ret = -ERANGE;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+static int build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, bool add_header,
+			 void *buf, int buf_len)
+{
+	void *end = buf + buf_len;
+	void *p;
+	int ret;
+
+	p = buf;
+	if (add_header) {
+		/* struct ceph_mon_request_header + protocol */
+		ceph_encode_64_safe(&p, end, 0, e_range);
+		ceph_encode_16_safe(&p, end, -1, e_range);
+		ceph_encode_64_safe(&p, end, 0, e_range);
+		ceph_encode_32_safe(&p, end, ac->protocol, e_range);
+	}
+
+	ceph_encode_need(&p, end, sizeof(u32), e_range);
+	ret = ac->ops->build_request(ac, p + sizeof(u32), end);
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pr_err("auth protocol '%s' building request failed: %d\n",
+		       ceph_auth_proto_name(ac->protocol), ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	dout(" built request %d bytes\n", ret);
+	ceph_encode_32(&p, ret);
+	return p + ret - buf;
+
+e_range:
+	return -ERANGE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle auth message from monitor.
+ */
+int ceph_handle_auth_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+			   void *buf, size_t len,
+			   void *reply_buf, size_t reply_len)
+{
+	void *p = buf;
+	void *end = buf + len;
+	int protocol;
+	s32 result;
+	u64 global_id;
+	void *payload, *payload_end;
+	u32 payload_len;
+	char *result_msg;
+	u32 result_msg_len;
+	int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	dout("handle_auth_reply %p %p\n", p, end);
+	ceph_decode_need(&p, end, sizeof(u32) * 3 + sizeof(u64), bad);
+	protocol = ceph_decode_32(&p);
+	result = ceph_decode_32(&p);
+	global_id = ceph_decode_64(&p);
+	payload_len = ceph_decode_32(&p);
+	ceph_decode_need(&p, end, payload_len, bad);
+	payload = p;
+	p += payload_len;
+	ceph_decode_need(&p, end, sizeof(u32), bad);
+	result_msg_len = ceph_decode_32(&p);
+	ceph_decode_need(&p, end, result_msg_len, bad);
+	result_msg = p;
+	p += result_msg_len;
+	if (p != end)
+		goto bad;
+
+	dout(" result %d '%.*s' gid %llu len %d\n", result, result_msg_len,
+	     result_msg, global_id, payload_len);
+
+	payload_end = payload + payload_len;
+
+	if (ac->negotiating) {
+		/* server does not support our protocols? */
+		if (!protocol && result < 0) {
+			ret = result;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* set up (new) protocol handler? */
+		if (ac->protocol && ac->protocol != protocol) {
+			ac->ops->destroy(ac);
+			ac->protocol = 0;
+			ac->ops = NULL;
+		}
+		if (!ac->protocol) {
+			ret = init_protocol(ac, protocol);
+			if (ret) {
+				pr_err("auth protocol '%s' init failed: %d\n",
+				       ceph_auth_proto_name(protocol), ret);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		ac->negotiating = false;
+	}
+
+	if (result < 0) {
+		pr_err("auth protocol '%s' mauth authentication failed: %d\n",
+		       ceph_auth_proto_name(ac->protocol), result);
+		ret = result;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = ac->ops->handle_reply(ac, global_id, payload, payload_end,
+				    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
+		ret = build_request(ac, true, reply_buf, reply_len);
+		goto out;
+	} else if (ret) {
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return ret;
+
+bad:
+	pr_err("failed to decode auth msg\n");
+	ret = -EINVAL;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+int ceph_build_auth(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+		    void *msg_buf, size_t msg_len)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	if (ac->ops->should_authenticate(ac))
+		ret = build_request(ac, true, msg_buf, msg_len);
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int ceph_auth_is_authenticated(struct ceph_auth_client *ac)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	if (ac->ops)
+		ret = ac->ops->is_authenticated(ac);
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_is_authenticated);
+
+int __ceph_auth_get_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+			       struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth,
+			       int peer_type, bool force_new,
+			       int *proto, int *pref_mode, int *fallb_mode)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	if (force_new && auth->authorizer) {
+		ceph_auth_destroy_authorizer(auth->authorizer);
+		auth->authorizer = NULL;
+	}
+	if (!auth->authorizer)
+		ret = ac->ops->create_authorizer(ac, peer_type, auth);
+	else if (ac->ops->update_authorizer)
+		ret = ac->ops->update_authorizer(ac, peer_type, auth);
+	else
+		ret = 0;
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	*proto = ac->protocol;
+	if (pref_mode && fallb_mode) {
+		*pref_mode = ac->preferred_mode;
+		*fallb_mode = ac->fallback_mode;
+	}
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ceph_auth_get_authorizer);
+
+void ceph_auth_destroy_authorizer(struct ceph_authorizer *a)
+{
+	a->destroy(a);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_destroy_authorizer);
+
+int ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+				       struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+				       void *challenge_buf,
+				       int challenge_buf_len)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	if (ac->ops && ac->ops->add_authorizer_challenge)
+		ret = ac->ops->add_authorizer_challenge(ac, a, challenge_buf,
+							challenge_buf_len);
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge);
+
+int ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+				      struct ceph_authorizer *a,
+				      void *reply, int reply_len,
+				      u8 *session_key, int *session_key_len,
+				      u8 *con_secret, int *con_secret_len)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	if (ac->ops && ac->ops->verify_authorizer_reply)
+		ret = ac->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(ac, a,
+			reply, reply_len, session_key, session_key_len,
+			con_secret, con_secret_len);
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply);
+
+void ceph_auth_invalidate_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int peer_type)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	if (ac->ops && ac->ops->invalidate_authorizer)
+		ac->ops->invalidate_authorizer(ac, peer_type);
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_invalidate_authorizer);
+
+/*
+ * msgr2 authentication
+ */
+
+static bool contains(const int *arr, int cnt, int val)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+		if (arr[i] == val)
+			return true;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int encode_con_modes(void **p, void *end, int pref_mode, int fallb_mode)
+{
+	WARN_ON(pref_mode == CEPH_CON_MODE_UNKNOWN);
+	if (fallb_mode != CEPH_CON_MODE_UNKNOWN) {
+		ceph_encode_32_safe(p, end, 2, e_range);
+		ceph_encode_32_safe(p, end, pref_mode, e_range);
+		ceph_encode_32_safe(p, end, fallb_mode, e_range);
+	} else {
+		ceph_encode_32_safe(p, end, 1, e_range);
+		ceph_encode_32_safe(p, end, pref_mode, e_range);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+e_range:
+	return -ERANGE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Similar to ceph_auth_build_hello().
+ */
+int ceph_auth_get_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, void *buf, int buf_len)
+{
+	int proto = ac->key ? CEPH_AUTH_CEPHX : CEPH_AUTH_NONE;
+	void *end = buf + buf_len;
+	void *lenp;
+	void *p;
+	int ret;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	if (ac->protocol == CEPH_AUTH_UNKNOWN) {
+		ret = init_protocol(ac, proto);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_err("auth protocol '%s' init failed: %d\n",
+			       ceph_auth_proto_name(proto), ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	} else {
+		WARN_ON(ac->protocol != proto);
+		ac->ops->reset(ac);
+	}
+
+	p = buf;
+	ceph_encode_32_safe(&p, end, ac->protocol, e_range);
+	ret = encode_con_modes(&p, end, ac->preferred_mode, ac->fallback_mode);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	lenp = p;
+	p += 4;  /* space for len */
+
+	ceph_encode_8_safe(&p, end, CEPH_AUTH_MODE_MON, e_range);
+	ret = ceph_auth_entity_name_encode(ac->name, &p, end);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out;
+
+	ceph_encode_64_safe(&p, end, ac->global_id, e_range);
+	ceph_encode_32(&lenp, p - lenp - 4);
+	ret = p - buf;
+
+out:
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return ret;
+
+e_range:
+	ret = -ERANGE;
+	goto out;
+}
+
+int ceph_auth_handle_reply_more(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, void *reply,
+				int reply_len, void *buf, int buf_len)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	ret = ac->ops->handle_reply(ac, 0, reply, reply + reply_len,
+				    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if (ret == -EAGAIN)
+		ret = build_request(ac, false, buf, buf_len);
+	else
+		WARN_ON(ret >= 0);
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int ceph_auth_handle_reply_done(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+				u64 global_id, void *reply, int reply_len,
+				u8 *session_key, int *session_key_len,
+				u8 *con_secret, int *con_secret_len)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	ret = ac->ops->handle_reply(ac, global_id, reply, reply + reply_len,
+				    session_key, session_key_len,
+				    con_secret, con_secret_len);
+	WARN_ON(ret == -EAGAIN || ret > 0);
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+bool ceph_auth_handle_bad_method(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+				 int used_proto, int result,
+				 const int *allowed_protos, int proto_cnt,
+				 const int *allowed_modes, int mode_cnt)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	WARN_ON(used_proto != ac->protocol);
+
+	if (result == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+		if (!contains(allowed_protos, proto_cnt, ac->protocol)) {
+			pr_err("auth protocol '%s' not allowed\n",
+			       ceph_auth_proto_name(ac->protocol));
+			goto not_allowed;
+		}
+		if (!contains(allowed_modes, mode_cnt, ac->preferred_mode) &&
+		    (ac->fallback_mode == CEPH_CON_MODE_UNKNOWN ||
+		     !contains(allowed_modes, mode_cnt, ac->fallback_mode))) {
+			pr_err("preferred mode '%s' not allowed\n",
+			       ceph_con_mode_name(ac->preferred_mode));
+			if (ac->fallback_mode == CEPH_CON_MODE_UNKNOWN)
+				pr_err("no fallback mode\n");
+			else
+				pr_err("fallback mode '%s' not allowed\n",
+				       ceph_con_mode_name(ac->fallback_mode));
+			goto not_allowed;
+		}
+	}
+
+	WARN_ON(result == -EOPNOTSUPP || result >= 0);
+	pr_err("auth protocol '%s' msgr authentication failed: %d\n",
+	       ceph_auth_proto_name(ac->protocol), result);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return true;
+
+not_allowed:
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return false;
+}
+
+int ceph_auth_get_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+			     struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth,
+			     int peer_type, void *buf, int *buf_len)
+{
+	void *end = buf + *buf_len;
+	int pref_mode, fallb_mode;
+	int proto;
+	void *p;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = __ceph_auth_get_authorizer(ac, auth, peer_type, true, &proto,
+					 &pref_mode, &fallb_mode);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	p = buf;
+	ceph_encode_32_safe(&p, end, proto, e_range);
+	ret = encode_con_modes(&p, end, pref_mode, fallb_mode);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	ceph_encode_32_safe(&p, end, auth->authorizer_buf_len, e_range);
+	*buf_len = p - buf;
+	return 0;
+
+e_range:
+	return -ERANGE;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_get_authorizer);
+
+int ceph_auth_handle_svc_reply_more(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+				    struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth,
+				    void *reply, int reply_len,
+				    void *buf, int *buf_len)
+{
+	void *end = buf + *buf_len;
+	void *p;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = ceph_auth_add_authorizer_challenge(ac, auth->authorizer,
+						 reply, reply_len);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	p = buf;
+	ceph_encode_32_safe(&p, end, auth->authorizer_buf_len, e_range);
+	*buf_len = p - buf;
+	return 0;
+
+e_range:
+	return -ERANGE;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_handle_svc_reply_more);
+
+int ceph_auth_handle_svc_reply_done(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+				    struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth,
+				    void *reply, int reply_len,
+				    u8 *session_key, int *session_key_len,
+				    u8 *con_secret, int *con_secret_len)
+{
+	return ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply(ac, auth->authorizer,
+		reply, reply_len, session_key, session_key_len,
+		con_secret, con_secret_len);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_handle_svc_reply_done);
+
+bool ceph_auth_handle_bad_authorizer(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,
+				     int peer_type, int used_proto, int result,
+				     const int *allowed_protos, int proto_cnt,
+				     const int *allowed_modes, int mode_cnt)
+{
+	mutex_lock(&ac->mutex);
+	WARN_ON(used_proto != ac->protocol);
+
+	if (result == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+		if (!contains(allowed_protos, proto_cnt, ac->protocol)) {
+			pr_err("auth protocol '%s' not allowed by %s\n",
+			       ceph_auth_proto_name(ac->protocol),
+			       ceph_entity_type_name(peer_type));
+			goto not_allowed;
+		}
+		if (!contains(allowed_modes, mode_cnt, ac->preferred_mode) &&
+		    (ac->fallback_mode == CEPH_CON_MODE_UNKNOWN ||
+		     !contains(allowed_modes, mode_cnt, ac->fallback_mode))) {
+			pr_err("preferred mode '%s' not allowed by %s\n",
+			       ceph_con_mode_name(ac->preferred_mode),
+			       ceph_entity_type_name(peer_type));
+			if (ac->fallback_mode == CEPH_CON_MODE_UNKNOWN)
+				pr_err("no fallback mode\n");
+			else
+				pr_err("fallback mode '%s' not allowed by %s\n",
+				       ceph_con_mode_name(ac->fallback_mode),
+				       ceph_entity_type_name(peer_type));
+			goto not_allowed;
+		}
+	}
+
+	WARN_ON(result == -EOPNOTSUPP || result >= 0);
+	pr_err("auth protocol '%s' authorization to %s failed: %d\n",
+	       ceph_auth_proto_name(ac->protocol),
+	       ceph_entity_type_name(peer_type), result);
+
+	if (ac->ops->invalidate_authorizer)
+		ac->ops->invalidate_authorizer(ac, peer_type);
+
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return true;
+
+not_allowed:
+	mutex_unlock(&ac->mutex);
+	return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(ceph_auth_handle_bad_authorizer);